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Many municipalities in the United States are short of the 
tax revenue they need and have had to cut spending on public 
goods, which has lowered the quality of life for their residents. 
Municipalities in Japan face the same problem. Japan has 
developed an effective method for raising tax revenue for local 
governments and revitalizing languishing economies. Japan’s 
“Hometown Tax” system empowers taxpayers to divert tax 
revenue from affluent urban governments to struggling rural 
governments, stimulates small businesses and enables rural 
governments to be more autonomous and financially 
independent.   
Under the Hometown Tax, a taxpayer that makes a 
charitable contribution to a local government receives a tax 
deduction and credit amounting to almost the entire value of 
the charitable contribution. At almost no extra cost, the 
taxpayer can select a Return Gift to receive from a local 
business in the region. Return Gifts range from deliveries of 
fresh locally-caught lobsters to vouchers for hot air balloon 
rides, and are listed on online portals that connect taxpayers 
to municipal and prefectural governments throughout Japan. 
The online portals have also become donation channels for 
regions experiencing natural disasters.  
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Implementing a Hometown Tax system in the United States 
would require the addition of state and municipal tax credits, 
and allowing for Return Gift selection would require the 
modification of U.S. quid pro quo contribution law. A 
Hometown Tax has risks, and could result in an excessive 
diversion of tax revenue from urban to rural governments. This 
Note concludes that, given its potential to enable struggling 
municipalities to prosper, increase the demand for goods 
produced by small businesses, and further the financial 
independence of local governments, the United States should 
consider instituting some variation of a Hometown Tax system.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many municipalities in the United States are short of the 
funds they need,1 and many rural communities are struggling 
to survive amidst the population shift to urban areas.2 Local 
 
1 Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 
1400–02 (2012) (explaining that budgetary crisis and depopulation due to 
industrial or rural abandonment are causes of cities being dissolved into 
“unorganized territory”); Class Dismissed, Forever: Rural Schools Face 
Closures, NBC NEWS (June 27, 2014, 4:50 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/education/class-dismissed-forever-rural-
schools-face-closures-n141556 [perma.cc/Z9ZW-NUAW]. 
2 According to a June 2015 report from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
the outmigration of young adults of childbearing age has outpaced retiree 
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governments facing shortages of tax revenue have had to cut 
spending on public goods in ways that have lowered the 
quality of life for their residents.3 Beyond the need to raise 
local government revenue to maintain residential quality of 
life, in an increasingly capricious political environment in 
which cities or states may not want to be subject to federal 
government demands, state and local governments could 
benefit from decreased dependence on federal funding.4 State 
 
attraction over several decades, and nine hundred counties (including 
nearly three hundred counties for the first time) faced population declines 
during 2010–2014. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL 
AMERICA AT A GLANCE: 2015 EDITION (2016), 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/44015/55581_eib145.pdf 
[perma.cc/S7UR-3QM4]. 
3 According to the program director at the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, “Without money coming in, you don’t pave the roads, you don’t 
pick up the trash, you don’t upgrade the sewer system.” For example, due 
to lack of local government revenue, Branson, Colorado has shifted schools 
online and towns in North Dakota and Michigan are reverting from paved 
to gravel roads. TI Henderson, Nebraska, Other States Fight Rural 
Population Flight, TRIB. NEWS SERV. (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://journalstar.com/news/state-and-regional/nebraska/nebraska-other-
states-fight-rural-population-flight/article_f0763826-4dbb-5837-b768-
64830e0f5977.html [perma.cc/ABE6-X2MJ].  
4 For example, U.S. cities like Boston, New York, and San Francisco 
want to maintain their “sanctuary-city” status amidst the immigration ban 
instituted by the Trump Administration. In response, President Trump 
signed an order to cut off federal funds to those cities, requiring U.S. officials 
to ensure that sanctuary cities “are not eligible to receive federal grants, 
except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes.” Scott Calvert, 
Alejandro Lazo, & Jon Kamp, Donald Trump, ‘Sanctuary City’ Mayors Set 
to Clash over Immigration Policies, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2017, 7:03 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sanctuary-cities-brace-for-proposed-funding-
cuts-1485373756 [perma.cc/5WDW-HFPB] (quoting the executive order). 
The order enables the Trump Administration to “move quickly to cut off 
funds and leave cities with serious shortfalls in their programs,” which 
severely undermines less wealthy cities’ autonomy if they wish to maintain 
their sanctuary-city statuses. Id. (quoting law professor Jonathan Turley); 
see also Jessica Bakeman, As Race to the Top Ends, Controversy Continues, 
POLITICO (July 15, 2015, 5:45 AM), http://www.politico.com/states/new-
york/albany/story/2015/07/as-race-to-the-top-ends-controversy-continues-
023795 [perma.cc/U39B-PMWA] (describing how “the federal government 
took advantage of states’ devastating fiscal circumstances,” which led to 
many problems in the New York education system). 
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and local governments have limited means of expanding their 
budgets without increasing tax rates or requesting a larger 
allocation of federal tax revenue. There are some measures, 
such as the Internal Revenue Code’s tax exemption of interest 
from state and municipal bonds, which incentivize individuals 
to lend money to states and municipalities.5 However, while 
such mechanisms can help increase local government budgets, 
none of these measures directly help local businesses or 
provide governments with much potential for self-sufficiency.  
Japan has developed a solution that has succeeded not only 
in raising funds for state6 and local governments, but also in 
creating a long-term potential for greater financial 
independence by stimulating local businesses. Under the 
Japanese Hometown Tax system, a taxpayer that makes a 
charitable contribution to a local government receives a 
double-benefit: (i) the taxpayer receives a tax deduction and 
credit amounting to almost the entire value of the charitable 
contribution7 and (ii) the taxpayer can, at almost no extra 
cost, select a gift of thanks (hereinafter, a “Return Gift”), 
typically produced by a local business in the region, to be 
delivered to the taxpayer’s doorstep. Return Gifts vary by 
municipality and prefecture, ranging from luxury food items 
such as lobster, beef, and high quality fruit to cultural items 
such as handmade swords,8 hand-carved Buddhist statues,9 
 
5 I.R.C. § 103 (2012).  
6 The Japanese word for state-like political subdivisions is “prefecture,” 
which will be used throughout this Note. Mentions of the word “prefecture” 
should be thought of as interchangeable with the word “state” for purposes 
of this Note. 
7  There is a fixed ¥2000 transaction fee per donation. Furusato no ̄zei to 
wa, FURUSATO CHOICE BY TRUSTBANK [hereinafter What Is Furusato 
Nōzei] https://www.furusato-tax.jp/about.html [perma.cc/WKJ7-XURM].  
8 Master Blaster, City in Gifu Offering Authentic Handcrafted Swords 




9 Editorial, Hometown Tax Scheme Seems to Be Taking Off, JAPAN 
TODAY (Apr. 14, 2015, 6:02 AM), 
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and gold ninja throwing-knives.10 Other municipalities offer 
experiences, from hot spring vacations and paragliding on 
local sand dunes to being “team president” of a professional 
soccer team for one day. 11  The double benefit taxpayers 
receive under this system has caused the Hometown Tax to be 
hugely successful and has diverted a significant amount of tax 
revenue from affluent urban governments to struggling rural 
governments, thereby revitalizing many rural economies and 
increasing the financial independence of their local 
governments.12  
This Note argues that given its success in stimulating local 
businesses and revitalizing languishing economies in the 
Japanese countryside, a Hometown Tax system could be a way 
to improve the financial state facing many local governments 
in the United States. 
In Part II, this Note describes the origin of Japan’s 
Hometown Tax system, how it works, and why it has been 
successful. Part III addresses arguments for and against 
instituting a Hometown Tax system. Part IV discusses the 
implementation of a Hometown Tax system in the United 
States. In doing so, this Note recognizes the incompatibility 
between the expectation of Return Gifts that motivates many 
Japanese Hometown Tax taxpayers to participate and the 
U.S. law governing tax deductions for charitable 
contributions. Under U.S. law, donations made with the 
expectation of a personal benefit13 are categorized as “quid pro 
 
https://www.japantoday.com/category/kuchikomi/view/hometown-tax-
scheme-seems-to-be-taking-off [perma.cc/BU3W-N4U2].  




11 Editorial, supra note 9. See infra Section II.C. for more examples. 
12 In 2016 alone, Japan’s Hometown Tax system resulted in ¥284.4 
billion (approx. $2.6 billion) in revenue to municipal and prefectural 
governments arising from the 7,260,000 donations made by taxpayers. See 
infra Section II.E.   
13 For a further discussion of the standards used to determine whether 
an individual has sufficient charitable intent, see the cases in Section 
IV.A.1, infra.  
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quo contributions,” which preclude donors from receiving a 
tax deduction for the donation’s full value. 14  Part IV also 
suggests some potential modifications for a U.S.-tailored 
Hometown Tax.  
This Note concludes that, on the whole, a Hometown Tax 
system’s potential to remedy the underfunding of local 
governments and increase the financial independence of 
political subdivisions in the United States is significant 
enough that the United States should strongly consider 
instituting some variation of a Hometown Tax system.  
II. JAPAN’S HOMETOWN TAX 
A. Origin of the Hometown Tax 
In the last twenty years, almost half of Japan’s municipal 
districts have vanished.15 While urban municipalities with 
large populations have flourished, the population flow from 
rural to urban areas has made it difficult for rural 
 
14 This depends on the amount and type of the donation in question. 
Donations made to local governments’ disaster relief funds would not result 
in any Return Gifts and would therefore be eligible for a full deduction 
(except for a fixed payment, e.g. $18, per donation that cannot be deducted). 
On the other hand, if a taxpayer receives Return Gifts valued at either $105 
or more, or 2% or more of the taxpayer’s donation amount, the taxpayer will 
be required to subtract the value of the Return Gift from the total amount 
of the donation claimable for a tax deduction. Given that most Return Gifts 
are typically luxury goods that amount to much more than 2% of the total 
donation amount, most donors would not receive a full deduction for their 
donations if a Hometown Tax were to be transplanted into the United States 
with no modification of U.S. law. Part IV addresses this issue in more detail.  
15 According to a report submitted to the government, nine hundred 
population centers will disappear within a generation as the nation ages. 
As the number of residents has dwindled, almost half of Japan’s municipal 
districts have already vanished through mergers to cut administrative costs 
of running their governments. Keiko Ujikane & Kyoko Shimodoi, Dying 
Japanese Towns Ply Beer in Drive for Tax Donations, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 
2014, 9:33 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-
14/dying-japan-towns-ply-free-beer-to-urbanites-in-tax-drive.  
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municipalities to retain their residents and collect sufficient 
tax revenue to sustain necessary functions and services.16  
Given the vast disparity in revenue sources among local 
governments throughout the country, Japan’s central 
government administers Local Allocation Tax (“LAT”) grants, 
under which portions of national taxes are transferred to local 
governments that lack sufficient tax revenue to keep 
running. 17  LAT grants fill the financial gap, or revenue 
shortfall, between the tax revenue collected and the cost of the 
public activities that local governments carry out. 18  Local 
governments are currently guaranteed LAT grants to the 
extent necessary for them to provide a baseline level of 
administrative services. 19  However, some argue that the 
availability of LAT grants has become a disincentive for rural 
governments to take measures to raise tax revenue and has 
essentially dissuaded rural economies from making good-faith 
efforts to improve regional economic growth, causing them to 
further deteriorate in terms of economic viability.20 The LAT 
grants have been characterized as “poverty traps” because 
 
16 Naoko Niitsu, Innovative ‘Hometown Tax’ Donation Program 
Supports Municipalities, JAPAN FOR SUSTAINABILITY (Aug. 2016), 
http://www.japanfs.org/en/news/archives/news_id035641.html 
[perma.cc/28GP-BPKY].  
17 Takero Doi, Poverty Traps with Local Allocation Tax Grants in 
Japan 2 (Keio/Kyoto Global COE Discussion Paper No. DP2010-002, 2010), 
http://ies.keio.ac.jp/old_project/old/gcoe-econbus/pdf/dp/DP2010-002.pdf 
[perma.cc/6CCT-7HE2]. 
18 The rationale for LAT grants is that they aim to “equalize” the nation 
and prevent differences in the financial conditions of local governments 
from being reflected in the public services they provide to their residents. 
Id. at 3.   
19 Given that the central government already runs on a deficit, LAT 
grants have further drawn criticism for being a potentially unnecessary 
source of government spending. See NOBUYUKI UDA, MINISTRY OF FIN., 
JAPAN, JAPAN: FISCAL DISCIPLINE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 15 (2015), 
www.mof.go.jp/pri/research/seminar/fy2015/tff2015_s5_03.pdf 
[perma.cc/KHA2-U2KP].  
20 Id. at 25; Motohiro Sato, Unit 05 Kickoff Paper: Good and Bad Fiscal 
Decentralization, NIPPON INST. FOR RESEARCH & ADVANCEMENT, 
http://www.spacenira.com/en/columns/1844.html [perma.cc/MF24-F5YF].  
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they help local governments on a year-to-year basis but do not 
provide a long-term remedy to rural economic development.21  
In 2008, the Japanese central government launched an 
alternate solution to narrow the disparity between urban and 
rural communities: Furusato Nōzei, the hometown tax system 
(“Hometown Tax”), which allows citizens to direct up to 
twenty percent of their inhabitant taxes22 to a municipality of 
their choice.23 Unlike the LAT grants, the Hometown Tax 
does not pose the risk of permitting rural economies to lock 
themselves into poverty traps.24 What makes the Hometown 
Tax unique (and worthy of potentially implementing in the 
United States) is that, in addition to providing a source of 
financial support for rural governments with revenue 
shortfalls, the Hometown Tax also stimulates local businesses 
in the rural areas and has spurred local governments to raise 
revenue from sources beyond their constituents.  
B. Hometown Tax Income Tax Deduction and 
Inhabitant Tax Credit Rules 
Under the Japanese Hometown Tax system, taxpayers 
that make a donation to a prefecture or municipality of their 
choosing receive, in the amount of the donation less a ¥2000 
(approx. $18)25 payment, (i) an income tax deduction, which 
the taxpayer will receive from the National Tax Agency in the 
 
21 Doi, supra note 17, at 2.  
22 “Inhabitant tax” is the collective term for prefectural tax and 
municipal tax on individual income. The tax rates are fixed (not 
progressive); the prefectural tax rate is 4% and municipal tax is 6%. 
Individuals that are domiciled in Japan as of January 1 each year are 
subject to these taxes. Laws & Regulations on Setting Up Business in Japan, 
JETRO, https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/setting_up/laws/section3/page 
7.html [perma.cc/W86Z-NLFT]. 
23 Furusato nōzei no gaiyō, MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMMC’NS, 
[Overview of Furusato Nōzei] 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/jichi_zeisei/czaisei/czaisei_seido/furus
ato/mechanism/about.html [perma.cc/23JG-AYX7].  
24 The Hometown Tax system exists in addition to the LAT grant 
system—it has not completely eliminated the necessity for LAT grants and 
likely will not any time soon. Sato, supra note 20. 
25 An exchange rate of $1 to ¥110 will be used throughout the Note.  
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form of a refund for a portion of the income taxes paid that 
year; and (ii) a tax credit for the inhabitant tax26 the taxpayer 
will pay to their residential local and prefectural governments 
the following year. To illustrate, a taxpayer earning an income 
of ¥3 million (approx. $27,000) who is in the 10% income tax 
bracket27 and donates ¥30,000 yen through the Hometown 
Tax will receive a corresponding ¥28,000 tax benefit (¥30,000 
minus the fixed ¥2000 payment).28 Once the taxpayer makes 
the donation, the recipient local government will provide a 
verification form,  which the taxpayer will submit to the 
National Tax Agency with their tax return to receive the 
following: (1) a ¥28,000 income tax deduction, which the 
taxpayer will receive from the National Tax Agency in the 
form of a ¥2800 income tax refund,29 and (2) an inhabitant tax 
credit for the remaining ¥25,200, which is credited toward the 
taxpayer’s inhabitant tax liability for the following year.30 
The process was made even easier in 2015, as taxpayers that 
donate to five or fewer local governments no longer need to 
 
26 KPMG TAX CORP., TAXATION IN JAPAN 2016, at 78 (2016), https://asset 
s.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/jp/pdf/jp-en-taxation-in-japan-201612.pdf 
[perma.cc/JX2J-3S3X]. 
27 Laws & Regulations on Setting Up Business in Japan, supra note 22. 
28 What Is Furusato Nōzei, supra note 7. 
29 The tax benefit from the income tax deduction is calculated as 
follows: (Donation – ¥2000 payment) x (Taxpayer’s income tax rate). For the 
above example, it would be (¥28,000 x 10%) = ¥2800. Thus, the taxpayer 
will receive a ¥2800 refund for the income taxes paid that year. See 
Furusato nōzei no shikumi: zeikin no kōjo ni tsuite, MINISTRY OF INTERNAL 
AFFAIRS & COMMC’NS, [hereinafter How Furusato Nōzei Works] 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/jichi_zeisei/czaisei/czaisei_seido/furus
ato/mechanism/deduction.html [perma.cc/2U8Y-HHBF] (providing the 
calculation formulas).  
30 What Is Furusato Nōzei, supra note 7; see also How Furusato Nōzei 
Works, supra note 29 (providing the following two formulas for the 
inhabitant tax credit: (a) the basic inhabitant tax credit formula: (Donation 
– ¥2000 payment) x 10%; and (b) the special inhabitant tax credit formula, 
provided it does not exceed 20% of the taxpayer’s inhabitant tax liability: 
(Donation – ¥2000 payment) x [100% – (10% basic credit rate) – (taxpayer’s 
income tax rate)].  
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submit any verification forms.31 As a result, in 2016 alone, the 
Hometown Tax amassed over ¥284 billion (approx. $2.6 
billion) in donations.32 
The name Furusato (Hometown) reflects the Hometown 
Tax’s original purpose, which was to encourage people who 
had moved to urban areas to direct a portion of their 
inhabitant taxes to the rural towns in which they were 
raised. 33  The purpose of the Hometown Tax has since 
broadened to allow all local governments to benefit from the 
voluntary transfer of tax revenue; taxpayers do not need to 
have any connection to the local governments to which they 
donate—in fact, many Hometown Tax donors have never even 
been to the regions to which they donate.34 For example, the 
 
31 See infra note 200 (describing Japan’s “One Stop” exception). It is 
also important to note, as T. R. Reid explains, Japan uses a tax system 
known as “precision withholding,” under which Kokuzeichō (the official tax 
collecting agency of Japan, hereinafter “the National Tax Agency”) sends 
every citizen a postcard in early March that sets forth “how much you 
earned, how much tax you owe, how much tax you’ve already paid through 
withholding . . . If the figures on the postcard from Kokuzeichō look about 
right, the taxpayer does nothing. The tax has been computed and paid 
already . . . As a result, paying income tax is a totally automatic process for 
about 80% of Japanese households, requiring no more work than reading a 
postcard once a year.” T. R. REID, A FINE MESS: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR A 
SIMPLER, FAIRER, AND MORE EFFICIENT TAX SYSTEM 220 (2017). 
32 Donations Under Hometown Tax Payment Program Hit Record ¥284 




33 Governor Hirai of Tottori Prefecture, where the concept of sending 
Return Gifts to donors originated, explains the Tottori government’s 
concern about the vicious cycle in which people raised in the countryside 
benefit from education and medical care funded with local government 
funds, but then move to cities to work, so the countryside governments 
never receive any tax revenue once those people start paying taxes. 
TOSHIKAZU TAKAMATSU, FURUSATO NŌZEI TO CHĪKI KEIEI [FURUSATO NŌZEI 
AND REGIONAL MANAGEMENT] 167 (2016).  
34 In comments on Satofuru, the online portal for Hometown Tax 
donations, donors have written “I found out about [town name] for the first 
time as I was searching for potential Return Gifts to choose. I am now going 
to start supporting [town name].” Id. at 119 (describing the online page of 
Abira-chō, a small town on Japan’s northern island of Hokkaidō).  
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town of Miyakonojō in Miyazaki attracted ¥4.2 billion 
(approx. $38 million), the greatest amount of Hometown Tax 
donations to a municipal government in 2016, but over 90% of 
its donors have no connection to Miyakonojō.35 Taxpayers are 
free and encouraged to make their donations to any of the 
1788 local governments throughout the country.36 
The word Nōzei (Tax Payment) is a reference to the income 
tax deductions and inhabitant tax credits for which the donors 
qualify by making the voluntary donations.37 Any donation a 
taxpayer makes is a one-time (non-recurring) donation to the 
municipality. The only cap is that the inhabitant tax credits 
the taxpayer earns cannot exceed twenty percent of the value 
of the taxpayer’s own inhabitant tax bill.38  
The donations have had a significant impact on the 
recipient localities—functioning, in some municipalities, as a 
main source of government income, and enabling local 
governments to provide government services funded on their 
own, rather than by LAT grants. For instance, the Hokkaidō 
city of Nemuro received close to one-third of its tax revenue 
 
35 Yoshiaki Nohara, Japan’s Rural Towns Are Luring Tax from Tokyo 
with Beef and Beer, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2017, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-09/japan-s-rural-towns-
are-luring-tax-from-tokyo-with-beef-and-beer [perma.cc/J6BJ-PCNX] 
(explaining that, according to a 2015 survey, ninety percent of donors have 
no connection to Miyakonojō). 
36 Nikkei Woman “Woman of the Year 2016” Happyō: Taishō wa Nihon 
ni kifubunka wo hirometa “Furusato Nōzei Boom” no tateyakusha ni [The 
Nikkei Woman “Woman of the Year 2016” Announcement: Grand Prize is a 
Leading Figure of “Furusato Tax Payment Boom” that Spreads Culture to 
Japan], NIKKEI BUS. PUBL’N, INC. (Dec. 7, 2015), 
corporate.nikkeibp.co.jp/information/newsrelease/20151207.shtml 
[perma.cc/3A68-2C6N].  
37 Tomohiro Osaki, Hometown ‘Tax’ Donations System Catching On, 
JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 20, 2014), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/10/20/reference/hometown-tax-
donations-system-catching/#.WdKp7jOZPBI [perma.cc/SBU5-JRK8].  
38 Jonathan Soble, In Japan, You Get a Tax Break and a Side of Lobster 
and Beef, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/31/business/international/in-japan-you-
get-a-tax-break-and-a-side-of-lobster-and-beef.html [perma.cc/J9V8-66CY].  
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through Hometown Tax donations in 2015.39 Moreover, the 
revenue raised by Miyakonojō through the Hometown Tax has 
created local jobs and allowed the city to fund dental 
checkups, children’s centers, and other community 
programs.40  
C. Return Gifts  
Most recipient local governments send donors local 
specialty products as Return Gifts to both incentivize and 
thank them for their donations. Online portals—including 
Satofuru and Furusato Choice—function like Amazon or other 
shopping websites and allow taxpayers to select which 
municipality to donate to based on the Return Gift they will 
receive. The taxpayer can simply search by the type of Return 
Gift and browse all of the municipalities that will send that 
particular Return Gift to the taxpayer’s home in return for the 
requisite donation amount.41 The recipient municipality uses 
the donation funds to pay a local business to supply and ship 
the Return Gift to the donor, and keeps as revenue the 
remainder of the donation. The minimum donation amounts 
required to receive Return Gifts vary based on the value of the 
Return Gifts themselves.42  
The following are examples of Return Gifts and their 
minimum required donation amounts. For a donation of 
¥20,000 (approx. $181) to the coastal town of Onjukumachi in 
Chiba Prefecture, a taxpayer can receive two live lobsters 
 
39 Hokkaidō City Repays ‘Hometown Tax’ Donors with Crab and Other 




40 Nohara, supra note 35 (quoting Shuichi Nomiyama, an official who 
runs Miyakonojō’s tax program).  
41 See, e.g., Satofuru: Furusato No ̄zei Site, SATOFURU, 
http://www.satofull.jp [perma.cc/YJU2-TWQM] (established in 2014) and 
Furusato Choice, FURUSATO CHOICE BY TRUSTBANK, http://furusato-tax.jp 
[perma.cc/WWH4-CDK5] (established in 2016).  
42 See Furusato Choice, supra note 41.   
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straight from the ocean. 43  For a ¥30,000 (approx. $273) 
donation to the town of Kōmi in Nagano Prefecture, a 
taxpayer can receive a voucher for a one-day ski lift ticket at 
a mountain in Kōmi, as well as one night at a local inn 
“including two meals.” 44  For an ¥80,000 (approx. $727) 
donation to the town of Kasai in Hyōgo Prefecture, a taxpayer 
whose ancestors are buried in a cemetery in Kasai can have a 
local cemetery professional clean the grave (and send the 
taxpayer a picture of it) three times throughout the year so 
that the taxpayer does not have to make the trips to do so.45 
For a ¥200,000 (approx. $1818) donation to the city of 
Yanagawa in Fukuoka Prefecture, a taxpayer can receive a 
custom-designed wooden dining table built locally in 
Yanagawa (home delivery and assembly service are 
included). 46  Further, for donations to Seki city in Gifu 
Prefecture, a taxpayer can receive a 72-centimeter-long sword 
that will be handmade with a desired inscription in 2017 for 
¥5,000,000 (approx. $45,454) or ¥3,000,000 (approx. $27,272), 
depending on whether the taxpayer would like the sword to be 
made by a master swordsmith or an “up-and-coming” 
swordsmith.47  
 
43 Iki Ise Ebi [Live Lobster] A, FURUSATO CHOICE BY TRUSTBANK,  
https://www.furusato-tax.jp/japan/prefecture/item_detail/12443/69664 
[perma.cc/7DKQ-QGS2]. 
44 Rizōto In Tachibanaya sukī-pakku (Otona ippaku nishoku-tsuki 
rifuto ichinichiken-tsuki) [Resort Inn Tachibanaya Ski Pack (For Adult, One 
Night, Two Meals and a One-Day Lift Pass)], FURUSATO CHOICE BY 
TRUSTBANK, https://www.furusato-tax.jp/japan/prefecture/item_detail 
/20303/150261 [perma.cc/WLU3-RZ5W].  
45 Ohaka sōji anshin daikō sābisu (nen sankai kōsu) [Reassuring 
Grave-Cleaning Service (Three Times-per-Year Package)], FURUSATO 
CHOICE BY TRUSTBANK, https://www.furusato-
tax.jp/japan/prefecture/item_detail /28220/332337 [perma.cc/DRP8-GG4J].  
46 Furusato nōzei de tēburu ga moraeru ninki jichitai to kangen-ritsu 
matome, FURUSATO NŌZEI NABI (Nov. 16, 2017), https://minatoku-
time.com/furusato-tax-recommend-goods/table/ [perma.cc/9LFV-7SAP]. 
47 Takuji Yoshizumi, City’s Sword Gift Cuts the Mustard with Eager 
Hometown Tax Donors, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Oct. 5, 2016, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.asahi.com/sp/ajw/articles/AJ201610050047.html 
[perma.cc/484R-WFTU].  
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The use of Return Gifts as a primary method to attract 
taxpayer participation in the Hometown Tax system has 
caused fierce inter-government competition and has given rise 
to potential problems, which are addressed in Part III.  
D. Natural Disaster Relief: No Return Gifts 
While the Return Gifts are the main incentive for 
taxpayers to donate to municipalities with which they have no 
connection, the Hometown Tax has a further benefit: Its 
online portals are extremely successful as donation portals in 
times of emergency. The surge in donations to earthquake-
affected areas that offer no Return Gifts shows that in some 
cases, taxpayers do not require a Return Gift incentive to 
donate to local governments in need.48  
For instance, within twenty-four hours of the Kumamoto 
Earthquake on April 16, 2016, Satofuru (the online portal) 
created a website called “Kumamoto Earthquake Disaster 
Emergency Donation Fund” and began accepting donations 
for Kumamoto Prefecture at midnight on April 17, 2016. In 
two days, Satofuru collected ¥2.8 million (approx. $25,454) on 
behalf of the city of Kikuchi in Kumamoto Prefecture.49 In the 
four days following the earthquake, Satofuru accepted pledges 
from 5477 individuals to give a total of over ¥81 million 
(approx. $736,363) in donations to Kumamoto Prefecture.50 
By the end of the year, Kumamoto Prefecture ended up 
receiving eighty-six times the total donations it received in 
2015, making Kumamoto Prefecture the recipient of the sixth 
highest sum in Yen of donations in 2016.51 
 
48 Tomoko Otake, Hometown Donation System Emerges as Effective 




49 Id. See infra Part III for a discussion of why relief can be more 
effective when donated to local governments.  
50 Otake, supra note 48.  
51 Furusato no ̄zei, jishuku keizoku de wareru jichitai [Municipalities 
Face Split over Self-Restraint and Perseverance], NIKKEI SHIMBUN (July 4, 
2017), 
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The online portals give donors an efficient way to send 
money directly to disaster-affected communities and to leave 
public messages of support. 52  Following the Kumamoto 
Earthquake, donations to Minamiaso Village in Kumamoto 
Prefecture were accompanied with messages from the donors 
encouraging victims to “stay strong” or “take care” amidst the 
hard circumstances.53 Many donors also stipulated that their 
donations be used specifically for the restoration of Kumamoto 
Castle.54 The convenience and accessibility of the trusted and 
accountable Hometown Tax online portals are likely to 
convince taxpayers at the margin to donate in times of 
emergency—especially those who want to contribute but are 
typically deterred from donating, since finding a reliable 
disaster relief organization can be cumbersome.55  
Given that Hometown Taxpayers now know they can go 
straight to the online portals to make tax credit-eligible 
donations that will reach the disaster-affected communities, 
the Hometown Tax goes beyond enabling local governments to 
obtain needed tax revenue and stimulating local businesses 
with a new source of demand: It provides a convenient 
mechanism for donations in times of urgency and need. The 
tendency of donors to look to the Hometown Tax as a 
mechanism for disaster relief occurred not just in relation to 
the Kumamoto Earthquake, but also in the wake of the Great 
East Japan Earthquake in March 2011, after which the 
severely affected Iwate and Fukushima Prefectures 




52 TAKAMATSU, supra note 33, at 140–41. 
53 Id.  
54 Municipalities Face Split over Self-Restraint and Perseverance, supra 
note 51. 
55 TAKAMATSU, supra note 33, at 141 (noting that donors have said 
“donating [through the Satofuru site] was easier than I thought” and “I was 
able to donate in under five minutes”).  
56 Anthony Rausch, Japan’s Furusato Nozei Tax System, ELECTRONIC 
J. CONTEMP. JAPANESE STUD., Apr. 2017, 
http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/ejcjs/vol17/iss1/rausch.html 
[perma.cc/VZQ4-S9SS ] (explaining that between 2010 and 2011, the 
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online portal currently includes a “disaster support” section, 
which lists twelve “recent projects,” consisting of seven 
earthquake relief projects, four typhoon relief projects, and 
one project for the Itoigawa Fire, which destroyed 150 
buildings in Niigata prefecture in 2016.57 The Hometown Tax 
has also spurred municipalities to set aside competition for 
donation revenue and support each other in times of need by 
putting disaster relief donation buttons on their own online 
pages to collect money for affected regions.58  
E. Participation in the Hometown Tax 
Since its establishment in 2008, the Hometown Tax system 
has skyrocketed from 30,000 donors in fiscal year 2009, 
contributing a total of ¥7.3 billion (approx. $66.3 million), to 
7,260,000 donors in fiscal year 2015, contributing a total of 
¥165 billion (approx. $1.5 billion). 59  In fiscal year 2016, 
contributions rose to ¥284.4 billion (approx. $2.6 billion).60 
The high participation rate is largely attributable to four 
factors: (i) publicity that the Hometown Tax system is a “great 
deal” because it affords taxpayers the ability to obtain Return 
Gifts at almost no extra cost to them, except for the fixed 
 
Hometown Tax-generated tax revenue directed to Iwate rose by sixteen 
times and the number of donations rose by ten times; and further, that the 
Hometown Tax-generated revenue directed to Fukushima in 2011 was eight 
times that of 2010, and the number of donations rose by seven times). 
57 Anthony Rausch, A Paradox of Japanese Taxation: Analyzing the 
Furusato Nozei Tax System, ASIA-PACIFIC J., June 2017, at 7, 
http://apjjf.org/2017/11/Rausch.html [perma.cc/S4GE-9UDX]. 
58 To fundraise for the municipalities affected by the Kumamoto 
Earthquake, four municipalities from all ends of Japan (in Yamaguchi 
Prefecture, Shizuoka Prefecture, Kanagawa Prefecture, and Osaka 
Prefecture) engaged in this support. Id. 
59 Local Govts Battle over ‘Hometown Tax’ Rewards, DAILY YOMIURI 
(May 16, 2015), https://www.questia.com/read/1P3-3685452291/local-govts-
battle-over-hometown-tax-rewards [perma.cc/X38Q-LZ2H] (providing 2009 
statistics); see also TAKAMATSU, supra note 33, at 11 (providing 2015 
statistics). 
60 Donations Under Hometown Tax Payment Program Hit Record ¥284 
Billion in 2016, supra note 32.  
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¥2000 payment;61 (ii) the procedure for making donations and 
applying for Return Gifts became much easier with the online 
portal sites; (iii) the maximum amount receivable in 
inhabitant tax credits was increased from ten to twenty 
percent in 2015; and (iv) local governments have become more 
aggressive in marketing their Return Gifts.62   
The resulting surge in Hometown Tax donations has 
provided depopulated towns with increased revenue and 
created demand for their local products. For example, between 
2014 and 2015, the town of Hirado in Nagasaki Prefecture had 
the highest earnings from Hometown Tax donations of any 
local government.63 Donors to Hirado —36,000 in one year—
outnumber residents.64 As Hirado’s population has dropped 
by half since the 1950s, the Hometown Tax has had a 
significant impact on its financial viability. 65  The ¥1.46 
billion (approx. $13.2 million) that Hirado received in 
Hometown Tax donations in fiscal year 2014 amounted to 
seven percent of its annual budget.66  
Beyond increasing Hirado’s local government revenue, the 
Hometown Tax has also stimulated Hirado’s local businesses. 
Hirado offers a wide variety of Return Gifts for donors to 
choose from: shipments of fresh seafood (slipper lobsters, 
spiral-shelled mollusks, oysters), a monthly vegetable 
delivery or a wedding photo shoot in Hirado.67 The donation 
amounts vary for each Return Gift, but it takes a donation of 
 
61 So long as their total donation amounts do not exceed the limit of 
20% of their income and inhabitant tax amounts, beyond the fixed required 
payment of ¥2000, taxpayers can receive each of the Return Gifts they apply 
for at no extra cost because they would have been paying the rest of their 
donation amounts as taxes to their own local governments (receiving no 
Return Gifts), were they not to donate them to the municipalities through 
the Hometown Tax system. Soble, supra note 38.   
62 TAKAMATSU, supra note 33, at 11. 
63 Soble, supra note 38. 
64 Id.  
65 See id.  
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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only ¥10,000 (approx. $91) to obtain the luxurious seafood 
delivery.68  
The existence of Return Gifts creates demand for local 
products and has helped the local businesses that produce 
them. For example, an asparagus farmer in Hirado says he 
now earns thirty percent of his total income from Return Gift 
requests, whereas he received no Return Gift-related income 
before the Hometown Tax was created.69  
The Hometown Tax system creates a win-win situation for 
under-funded governments, local businesses, and taxpayers. 
Under-funded governments gain access to a source of public 
finance, and the local businesses involved in providing Return 
Gifts to the taxpayers enjoy new avenues of demand for their 
products and a wider customer base. Further, taxpayers 
receive local products—often fresh from the countryside—at 
almost no extra cost while also feeling good about the fact that 
they are able to help revitalize the rural economy.   
III. THE NEED FOR A HOMETOWN TAX  
A. Justifications for a Hometown Tax System 
1. Stimulates Local Businesses and Communities  
A compelling justification for instituting a Hometown 
Tax—and what distinguishes it from the already-existing 
measures for raising local government revenue in 
municipalities with dwindling populations or low-income 
levels—is that the system creates a new source of demand for 
products made by local businesses and enables them to obtain 
repeat customers who would not otherwise have learned about 
their products. 
When a local government selects a regional or local 




70 For municipalities or regions that are not famous for any local 
specialty goods, choosing what to offer as Return Gifts may be difficult. 
Municipalities have addressed this selection task in creative ways. For 
instance, in 2015, the city of Hashima in Gifu Prefecture tasked a project 
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must select a local producer to supply the good. 71  Local 
businesses that are selected often enjoy unprecedented surges 
in demand and receive orders from customers who have never 
heard of them before. For instance, when the town of 
Miyakonojō in Miyazaki Prefecture began offering roast beef 
supplied by a local meat producer as a Return Gift, the local 
meat producer increased its sales five-fold.72 Oftentimes, the 
increase in demand is long-lasting, creating a new and stable 
source of buyers for the local suppliers’ products. 73  For 
example, before the town of Ōsaki in Kagoshima Prefecture 
began participating in the Hometown Tax system, a local 
grilled-eel business in the town of Ōsaki received fifty percent 
of its annual eel orders in the days leading up to and 
immediately following the traditional eel-eating day in July.74 
After Ōsaki began offering grilled eel as a Return Gift for 
Hometown Tax donors, the local business enjoyed steady 
demand for grilled eel in the winter for the first time.75  
 
team including twenty female officials in their twenties to select the Return 
Gifts Hashima should offer to taxpayers living elsewhere who donate to the 
city under the Hometown Tax system. The Hashima government felt that 
“the viewpoints of young women would help rediscover local specialties that 
had faded into obscurity.” Rural Governments Taking Unique Tacks to 




71 Ideally, the municipality will rely fully on local producers. According 
to a survey conducted on the Satofuru online portal, 95.7% of respondents 
answered that they use producers in their townships. However, in some 
cases, such as when donations exceed the expected amount of donations, 
and thus the amount of Return Gifts to send exceed the selected producer’s 
production capacity, a municipality may order the good from a supplier in a 
differing municipality. 20.3% of respondents answered that they would turn 
to other townships to supplement a deficiency in supplying Return Gifts if 
doing so was necessary. TAKAMATSU, supra note 33, at 42.  
72 Furusato no ̄zei, tokusanhin ni aratana kokyaku [Furusato no ̄zei, New 
Customers for Specialty Goods], NIKKEI SHIMBUN (Dec. 10, 2016), 
http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASDJ01H1L_Q6A211C1MM0000/ 
[perma.cc/5L7R-WWKV]. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
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The newly increased, stabilized demand for local 
businesses’ products has also led to those businesses being 
discovered by national distributors, who then decide to 
distribute their goods. National distributors can greatly help 
local businesses by providing year-long demand, which also 
helps local businesses that may have an over-supply of 
products. For instance, the town of Anami in Tokushima 
Prefecture was not known nationally before the Hometown 
Tax, but when its farm products became popular as 
Hometown Tax Return Gifts, 76  national distribution giant 
AEON took notice and now distributes Anami’s products 
through a subsidiary it created in April 2016 called AEON 
Tokushima Awa Farms.77 In times of over-supply, AEON’s 
national distribution helps keep the prices of Anami farms’ 
products from falling.78 Anami’s farms were unlikely to have 
been discovered by—or considered as suppliers for—AEON 
were it not for the Hometown Tax, which gave the businesses 
a new avenue to demonstrate the popularity of their products. 
The price municipalities pay local businesses for their 
production of the Return Gifts is important to consider in 
examining the advantages that local businesses enjoy as a 
result of the Hometown Tax. Typically, the local government 
pays the local business the fair market value of the Return 
Gifts.79 But some municipalities (11%) pay less than the fair 
market value for the specialty goods they buy and send to 
donors. 80  At first glance, this may seem to refute the 
argument that the Hometown Tax always stimulates local 
businesses. However, the approach being taken in this portion 
of municipalities is in fact often driven by the local businesses. 
For many small, regional businesses, the Hometown Tax is an 
optimal advertising opportunity: listing their products on the 
online portals gives the businesses instant access to potential 
 
76 TAKAMATSU, supra note 33, at 66.  
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
79 According to a survey conducted by Satofuru, 82.6% of municipalities 
pay the fair market value for the specialty goods they buy and send to 
donors. Id. at 43.  
80 Id.  
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donors throughout the country. From the perspective of such 
businesses, the Hometown Tax is an opportunity to make 
their products known to many people, as donors may 
ultimately become customers.81 As the “audience” browsing 
the Hometown Tax online portals is already likely to make a 
donation and order a Return Gift, the Hometown Tax gives 
businesses prime access to potential customers who are 
arguably more likely to buy their products through selecting 
them as gifts for their Hometown Tax donations than are the 
general audiences that the businesses could reach via 
television or print advertising.  
Hometown Tax donors that like the Return Gift will either 
become repeat donors, or even direct customers of the local 
business, independent of the Hometown Tax system. For 
example, the municipal government of the town of 
Sakaiminato in Tottori Prefecture used the strategy of paying 
local businesses less than fair market value for Return Gifts 
to draw attention to its municipality and maximize the 
quantity of its donations by giving donors a good deal.82  
Further, a supplier fishery contractor agreed to forego 
being fully compensated for the fried crab sent to donors as 
Return Gifts because it saw the potential for such donors to 
become repeat customers in the future.83 Sure enough, many 
of the donors subsequently placed crab orders directly from 
the fishery, independent of the Hometown Tax donations, and 
became repeat customers.84 Thus, a Hometown Tax is also 
justifiable on the grounds that it can help local businesses in 
the long term, providing them with access to repeat customers 
that they would not otherwise have been able to reach through 
the advertising efforts typically within their budgets.  
Beyond stimulating local businesses, the Hometown Tax 
system has also invigorated communities and improved the 
level of municipality-funded public services. Due to the tax 
revenue that it received through the Hometown Tax 
 
81 Id. at 155.  
82 Id. at 169. 
83 Id. 
84 Id.   
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donations, the town of Miyakonojō has successfully increased 
the amount of local jobs and “fund[ed] dental checkups, 
children’s centers and other community programs.”85 
2. Creates a Population Inflow by Attracting New 
Permanent Residents  
The Hometown Tax system also has the long-term aim of 
raising awareness of rural municipalities to try to entice 
urban residents to move (back) to them. Return Gifts 
involving coupons to stay at local hotels or visit local hot 
springs directly serve this purpose; if a town can get a 
taxpayer to visit in person, the taxpayer will not only spend 
money in the town while visiting, but also experience the 
town’s charm and have the opportunity to envision living 
there. In a 2016 survey, 70% of donors answered that they 
would like to visit the town to which they made Hometown 
Tax donations.86  
In addition, the stimulation of the local economy itself, 
created by the demand for Return Gifts, may motivate retired 
residents to reenter the workforce. For instance, when the 
town of Anan in Nagano Prefecture began offering twenty-
kilogram bags of prized local rice as Return Gifts for tax 
donations, it received such an enthusiastic response that 
elderly residents who had given up farming their rice paddies 
began cultivating them again.87 
Yet, in the worst case, it is possible that municipalities that 
do not have desirable local specialty goods to offer as Return 
Gifts, or are unable to hire an effective marketing staff, will 
not actually be successful in stimulating local business. In 
 
85 Yoshiaki Nohara, Rural ‘Furusato Nozei’ Beer, Beef Thank-yous 
Costing Urban Japan Much-Needed Revenues, JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/13/national/rural-furusato-
nozei-beer-beef-thank-yous-costing-urban-japan-much-needed-
revenues/#.WcSawTOZPBI [perma.cc/JG7W-CVKJ].  
86 Takaaki Yasuda, Kōka-dai daga jakuniku kyoushoku [The 
Hometown Tax Is Effective, but Cutthroat], MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Sept. 7, 
2016), http://mainichi.jp/articles/20160907/ddm/004/070/002000c 
[perma.cc/4BXZ-LST5].  
87 Japan’s Rural Regions: Hometown Dues, supra note 10.  
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such cases, the Hometown Tax would not provide financial 
benefits, and would fail at both (i) raising local government 
revenue and (ii) stimulating local businesses. Nevertheless, 
the Hometown Tax may yield non-pecuniary benefits, such as 
making non-resident taxpayers aware that certain towns even 
exist. Discussing his town’s involvement in the Hometown 
Tax system, Noriharu Yoshihara, a financial planning official 
in the town of Higashikawa in the northern island of 
Hokkaidō, explains, “We did not start this program for 
financial benefits and are instead focusing on increasing the 
nonresident population  . . . . The system is effective in making 
people in big cities more interested in the countryside.” 88 
According to municipality data, the number of visitors to 
Higashikawa rose to more than one million in the 2013 fiscal 
year, up 18% from five years earlier. 89  Moreover, the 
population increased by 3.3% in five years, from 
approximately 7800 residents to 8092 residents as some 
visitors moved permanently to the town.90 
By offering a way to spread awareness of small, rural 
towns and implanting the prospect of moving to the towns in 
donors’ minds, the Hometown Tax may also provide a way to 
counteract the population flow from rural to urban areas.  
3. Donor Satisfaction from Giving 
In order to determine whether implementing a system akin 
to the Japanese Hometown Tax would garner taxpayer 
participation in the United States, it is helpful to consider 
whether U.S. taxpayers, on an individual level, would be 
interested in participating in it.  
 
88 Japan’s Ailing Rural Towns Push Free Beer, Other Perks to 
Urbanites in Tax-sharing Drive, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 15, 2014), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/08/15/national/social-issues/japans-
ailing-rural-towns-push-free-beer-perks-urbanites-tax-sharing-
drive/#.WHkUmjvpVAY [perma.cc/5C8T-ZY9A].  
89 Id.  
90 Higashikawa-chō no gaiyō [Overview of Higashikawa Town], 
HIGASHIKAWA TOWN BOARD OF EDUC., http://higashikawa-edu.jp/assets/日本
一の〝子育て・教育の町づくり〟.pdf [perma.cc/WCW6-F7Z2].  
KANZAWA – FINAL 
1124 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
Empirical studies have shown that people value control 
over the use of their taxes. 91  A study in which American 
taxpayers were allowed to allocate ten percent of their income 
taxes to any portion of the federal budget shows that 
permitting taxpayers to allocate their income tax to programs 
of their choice generates significant increases in taxpayer 
satisfaction.92  Moreover, Professors Yair Listokin and David 
Schizer argue that “warm glow,” which is another “powerful 
motivation for charitable giving,” could arise for mandatory 
tax payments if the individuals know and choose the 
municipalities to which they donate.93 If the knowledge that 
one gave money to an underpopulated rural municipality 
generates warm glow, many taxpayers may participate in an 
American Hometown Tax. Assuming people experience a 
“warm glow” from supplying public goods as such, and not 
necessarily public goods for their own use, an American 
Hometown Tax may yield the further benefit of lowering the 
number of people that evade taxes.94 
4. Taxpayer Autonomy  
Comprehensive online portals like Satofuru and Furusato 
Choice allow taxpayers to search and sort the recipient 
governments to which they want to donate by any or all of the 
following criteria: (i) the Return Gift the taxpayer will receive; 
(ii) the geographic location of the recipient government; (iii) 
 
91 Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer 
Support for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 
TAX L. REV. 179, 184 (2013). 
92 Cait Lamberton, Your Money, Your Choice, DEMOCRACY, Spring 2011, 
at 46, http://www.democracyjournal.org/20/your-money-your-choice/ 
[perma.cc/7EGJ-Z3T3]. 
93 “Warm glow” is a type of prosocial behavior in which individuals give 
to charity—not only because they value a particular public good—but also 
because they want to be the one providing it. Listokin & Schizer, supra note 
91, at 189–90. 
94 Donors may be happy to be “the source” of the contribution in the 
sense that it happened because of their choice, regardless of whether they 
directly reap the public benefit or not. David M. Schizer, Subsidizing 
Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private Pursuit 
of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 231 (2009). 
KANZAWA – FINAL 
No. 3:1100] THE HOMETOWN TAX AND RURAL U.S. ECONOMIES 1125 
the donation amount; and (iv) the specific project or cause for 
which the donation money will be used. 95  Taxpayers can 
narrow their searches for recipient governments by filtering 
for any of the following causes: nature conservation, 
preservation of cultural traditions, non-profit support, 
education, regional cultural festivals, tourism, medical care 
and welfare, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, tourism, 
landscape, music, international exchanges, and disaster 
relief. 96  Currently, 1623 local governments (over ninety 
percent of Hometown Tax-participating governments) afford 
taxpayers the ability to choose the policies and projects to 
which to direct their donation money.97 For example, the town 
of Tokamachi in Niigata Prefecture allows taxpayers to choose 
any of the following policies and projects: creating a more 
elderly-friendly society, boosting efforts to preserve nature, 
and/or promoting sports and arts-related activities.98 Once a 
taxpayer has located a recipient government that meets 
criteria suitable to him or her, the taxpayer can then order 
Return Gift(s) by donating the requisite amount of money to 
the local governments via the online portal.99  
In an American Hometown Tax system, if municipalities 
similarly offer taxpayers the autonomy to decide where to 
allocate a portion of their tax money (via the charitable 
contribution followed by the tax credit), the Hometown Tax is 
likely to provide American taxpayers with autonomy in a part 
of their lives that has until now afforded almost no agency or 
freedom. 100  Given that many Americans deeply value 
autonomy, creating an opportunity for choice where it 
previously did not exist is likely to be attractive to many 
people.101  
 
95 Furusato Choice, supra note 41.  
96 Id.  
97 TAKAAKI HŌDA, FURUSATO NŌZEI NO RIRON TO JISSEN [THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF FURUSATO NŌZEI] 63 (2017). 
98 Osaki, supra note 37. 
99 Id.   
100 Lamberton, supra note 92, at 2. 
101 Id.  
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5. Efficiency and Administrability  
A Hometown Tax can also increase efficiency. The prospect 
of receiving money from donors forces local governments to 
evaluate their municipality and region and reflect on what 
goods may be marketable to people around the country.  
A Hometown Tax may also increase efficiency in the 
administration of tax collection by creating a legal way for 
taxpayers to divert a portion of their inhabitant tax money to 
causes that they care about. Giving taxpayers an opportunity 
to actively choose where their tax money goes gives them a 
sense of ownership over their tax obligations, which, in turn, 
is likely to raise the level of taxpaying compliance and lower 
the amount of tax evasion.102 According to a study conducted 
by James Alm, Betty Jackson, and Michael McKee in 1993, 
“[G]overnment can generate greater compliance by ensuring 
that individuals feel that they have a say in the manner in 
which their taxes are spent . . . and that taxes are spent in 
ways consistent with [their] preferences.”103 Recent research 
shows that “taxpayers will even give voluntarily to the 
government if they support the way their money will be 
used.”104  
In some cases, however, the Hometown Tax system’s 
additional costs and uncertainty may not render it more 
efficient than applying for government grants. Obtaining 
donations does not come without cost: Many municipalities 
have created new marketing positions to oversee the 
municipalities’ participation in the Hometown Tax system.105  
Further, the Hometown Tax does not guarantee that the 
Return Gifts a municipality offers will be desirable to 
taxpayers; given the large number of municipalities offering 
 
102 Listokin & Schizer, supra note 91, at 183–84.  
103 James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Fiscal Exchange, 
Collective Decision Institutions, and Tax Compliance, 22 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 285, 301–02 (1993).  
104 See Listokin & Schizer, supra note 91 (describing the study in Tara 
Larson Brown et al., Giving to Government: Voluntary Taxation in the Lab, 
95 J. PUB. ECON. 1190, 1190–91 (2011)).  
105 See TAKAMATSU, supra note 33.  
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many different kinds of goods, even the most popular online 
portals—like Satofuru and Furusato Choice—can make 
selecting a Return Gift time-consuming. For example, even if 
a taxpayer decides they would like to donate to a municipality 
that will send them a Return Gift of beef, they must still 
decide which of the 7046 choices of beef to request.106  
Ultimately, Japan’s Hometown Tax offers taxpayers the 
ability to allocate up to twenty percent of their inhabitant tax 
bill and is thus an example of an allocation of mandatory 
payments, as opposed to an allocation of voluntary payments, 
to uses that the taxpayers support. Giving taxpayers twenty 
percent of the control over where and how their inhabitant 
taxes are spent has the potential to “help generate warm glow 
for the portion they allocate and, possibly, for the rest as 
well.”107 In the Hometown Tax context, Professor Shigeki Uno 
argues that, through the act of making a Hometown Tax 
donation, a taxpayer not only participates in policy-making 
that will shape the future of the local area, but also “becomes 
a part of that place’s history and ongoing story.”108 Research 
shows that if taxpayers perceive that their preferences are 
adequately represented and the taxpayers are supplied with 
public goods, their identification with the state, and thus their 
willingness to pay taxes, increases.109  
 
106 The reason the choices available for beef exceed the total number of 
municipalities participating in the Hometown Tax system is that many 
municipalities offer multiple types of beef, varying in quality and level of 
luxuriousness, as well as the part of the cow the meat is from. See 
Recommended Special Beef Based on Monetary Amount, FURUSATO CHOICE 
BY TRUSTBANK, https://www.furusato-tax.jp/feature/a/series_beaf 
[perma.cc/4RQZ-WVV2]. 
107 See Listokin & Schizer, supra note 91, at 212–15 (discussing the 
difference between allocating mandatory vs. voluntary tax payments, and 
several ways to constrain taxpayer choice—the second under which the 
Hometown Tax system fits most closely).  
108 Rausch, supra note 56 (referencing Interview by NHK with Shigeto 
Uno, Professor, Univer. of Tokyo (Jan. 26, 2015), 
http://www.nhk.or.jp/gendai/articles/3605/1.html [perma.cc/U46W-SHW5]).  
109 See Listokin & Schizer, supra note 91, at 183–86 (discussing three 
studies analyzing whether people are more likely to pay taxes when taxes 
are spent in ways consistent with their preferences). 
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If taxpayers who support the way that their tax dollars are 
spent are indeed more likely to voluntarily comply with their 
tax obligations and are less likely to change their behavior to 
avoid paying taxes, then the Hometown Tax system offers a 
potential mechanism to deter tax evasion. Lower tax evasion 
would lower the amount of administrative expenditures on 
enforcing tax compliance, which could partly offset any 
increased efforts to administer the Hometown Tax.  
6. Opportunities for Regional Collaboration 
While a Hometown Tax creates fierce competition among 
municipalities to attract the greatest amount of donations 
possible, it has also given municipalities the opportunity and 
incentive to collaborate. When natural disasters occur, 
unaffected municipalities have successfully used their 
Hometown Tax donation pages to collect donations to give to 
the disaster-affected municipalities. 110  Moreover, even 
without natural disasters as the instigators, the Hometown 
Tax has spurred regional collaboration among municipalities 
that want to coordinate marketing efforts to attract donors.111  
B. Arguments Against a Hometown Tax  
Through its creation of demand for Return Gifts, Japan’s 
Hometown Tax has created an outlet for the products of local 
businesses and the potential for rural economies to flourish. 
However, there are reasons to be skeptical of implementing 
the system as it currently exists, which this Section will 
address.   
 
110 See supra Section II.D. (describing how other municipalities and 
regions collected a huge amount of donations for the towns affected by the 
Kumamoto Earthquake in April 2016). 
111 18.8% of responders to the Satofuru survey mentioned in 
TAKAMATSU answered that they sometimes collaborate in sending Return 
Gifts with other municipalities to which they have a “connection.”  
TAKAMATSU, supra note 33, at 41.  
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1. Inefficiency 
i. Non-Locally Produced Return Gifts and 
Non-Gifts Produced Locally 
A major criticism of Japan’s Hometown Tax is that the 
fierce inter-governmental competition it fosters has caused 
some municipalities to cheat, thereby undermining the 
purpose of the system. Municipalities that do not have local 
specialty goods that they deem desirable enough to attract 
donors sometimes offer as Return Gifts goods that are not 
produced by local businesses (or even produced in Japan). 
Return Gifts of this sort have tended to be expensive, luxury 
products like Apple’s iPad.112 The problem with such Return 
Gifts is that they may accomplish the Hometown Tax’s first 
aim to raise government revenue, but they will not accomplish 
its further aim to stimulate local businesses. A local 
government that chooses to pay Apple to supply iPads as 
Return Gifts does not help local businesses. It does not create 
a source of new demand or give them access to a wider 
customer base for them.  
What a local government ought to do to regulate this issue 
depends on the precise motivation that policymakers have as 
their goal. If the goal is (i) to help local governments raise 
short-term tax revenue, providing iPads as Return Gifts may 
accomplish this goal and be justifiable. With this goal, some 
local governments could properly offer non-locally produced 
iPads as Return Gifts, so long as they received enough 
donations to at least break even. However, if the goal is (ii) to 
help local governments raise money while also stimulating 
local businesses, then offering iPads as Return Gifts is not 
justifiable.  
 
112 See, e.g., City Sales Apps, ODAWARA CITY OFFICIAL WEBSITE, 
http://www.city.odawara.kanagawa.jp/field/tax2/furusato/appli/ 
[perma.cc/46TC-2NKE] (listing the “Strength of Odawara” photo gallery 
app with photos of Odawara City that “comes along with” one of nine 
different types of iPads that one can purchase via Hometown Tax donations 
ranging from ¥130,000 to ¥250,000 (approx. $1182 to $2273)).  
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Another example of Hometown Tax Return Gifts that 
policymakers should eliminate if they are seeking to 
accomplish goal (ii) is gift cards that a donor can redeem for 
cash from third parties online. Offering gift cards as Return 
Gifts basically invites donors that do not want to make a trip 
to the region to resell the gift cards online. However, a gift 
card for a local business should be more justifiable; even if sold 
online to a non-donor, it would still provide income for the 
local businesses where it can be redeemed. Depending on the 
non-donor that buys the gift card, even online resales could 
conceivably open the door for local businesses to have wider 
brand recognition and repeat customers.113 
In 2015, the Japanese government offered guidance on 
these issues, advising municipalities not to offer Return Gifts 
that would undermine the aims of the Hometown Tax. The 
government offered examples of such goods, including: (1) 
easily exchangeable prepaid (gift) cards; or (2) specialty goods 
for which the price comprises a high ratio of the donation 
amount.114 In the same document, the Japanese government 
directed municipalities not to reveal to the donor the 
percentage of the required donation amount that the value of 
a Return Gift comprises (hereinafter, the “Return-Gift-Value-
to-Donation Ratio).115 It is unclear how strictly these rules are 
enforced or if there is a penalty for municipalities that do not 
follow them.  
Such government guidance had some influence, but not 
enough.116 As of June 2016, seven municipalities cancelled 
their listings of certain Return Gifts, and thirty-three 
 
113 See Furusato Nōzei, New Customers for Specialty Goods, supra note 
72.  
114 See Henreihin (Tokusanhin) sōfu e no taiō ni tsuite [Regarding 
Dealing with the Sending of Return Gifts (Specialty Goods)], MINISTRY OF 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMMC’NS, http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/ 
000351771.pdf [perma.cc/QV7V-QX92]. 
115 See id.  
116 See, e.g., Furusato nōzei, kifugaku no 4-wari ga henreihin keihi ni 
[40% of Furusato Nōzei Donation Amounts Used on Return Gift Expenses], 
NIKKEI SHIMBUN (June 18, 2016), 
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASFS17H6H_Y6A610C1NN1000/ 
[perma.cc/G9Q2-7VKY]. 
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municipalities altered their Return Gift descriptions to 
remove mention of the percentage of the donation the value of 
the Return Gift comprises.117 Yet, while most of the main 
online portals—such as Furusato Choice—quickly prohibited 
local governments from listing iPads and other non-locally 
produced electronics, other online portals—such as Yahoo 
Japan or Rakuten—continued to sell them.118 For example, 
through at least February 2017, Yahoo Japan and Rakuten 
sold a “photo gallery app” with pictures of Odawara City that 
“comes along with” an iPad mini of the Hometown Tax donor’s 
choice.119  
On March 31, 2017, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications gave stricter, clearer guidelines: Starting on 
April 1, 2017, (1) the value of any Return Gift must not exceed 
thirty percent of the value of the required donation and (2) 
municipalities should not offer as Return Gifts computers, 
tablets, consumer electronics, bicycles, jewelry, instruments, 
or other luxury items.120 These guidelines seem to have had a 
 
117 Id.  
118 2017 Furusato nōzei de ipadair ya pro taburetto ga moraeru jichitai 
to kangen-ritsu matome [Compilation of Local Governments from Which You 
Can Receive iPad Air or Pro Tablets with Furusato Nōzei 2017], FURUSATO 
NAVI, http://minatoku-time.com/furusato-tax-recommend-goods/ipad-yaizu-
odawara-city/ [perma.cc/9RY2-PWPZ].  
119 As explained below, as of September 22, 2017, this photo gallery and 
iPad set are no longer available. The following footnotes include the links to 
the original listings, last accessed in February 2017. 0187 iPad mini 
4/32GB with GD for City Sales App Use, Odawara City, Kanagawa 
Prefecture, Furusato No ̄zei Item Details,” YAHOO JAPAN (2017), 
http://furusatonozei.yahoo.co.jp/detail/16712; [Furusato No ̄zei] City Sales 
App ‘Strength of Odawara’ 10-month Use Ticket (comes with iPad mini 4 
Wi-Fi 32 GB – Gold), Odawara City, Kanagawa Prefecture, RAKUTEN 
MARKETPLACE (2017), http://item.rakuten.co.jp/f142069-odawara/6704-
30002502/. 
120 Furusato nōzei ni kakaru henreihin no sōfu nado ni tsuite, 
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMMC’NS (Apr. 1, 2017), 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000476919.pdf [perma.cc/4RSP-
QFP4]; Furusato nōzei henrei, kaden mo jishuku yōsei Sōmushō “jōgen 3-
wari” kijun [Ministry of Affairs Specifies a “30% maximum” for Furusato 
Nōzei Return Gifts, and Requests No Consumer Electronics], NIKKEI 
SHIMBUN (Mar. 31, 2017), 
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greater impact in spurring local governments to comply. Of 
the two hundred prefectural or municipal governments that 
have received the highest amount of money from donations, 
almost ninety percent have stated they intend to alter their 
practices.121 The town of Yaizu in Shizuoka Prefecture stated 
in May that it would eliminate cameras and watches as 
Return Gifts, and the town of Miyakonojō in Mizayaki 
Prefecture vowed to decrease its Return-gift-Value-to-
Donation Ratio from fifty percent to thirty percent. 122 
Further, Ina City in Nagano Prefecture vowed to stop offering 
televisions as Return Gifts, Yamagata City in Yamagata 
Prefecture vowed to stop offering furniture and golf putters, 
and other regions agreed to stop offering air conditioners by 
the end of September.123 As of September 22, 2017, Odawara 
City’s photo gallery app and iPad mini set also appears to have 
been discontinued.124 
Individual prefectures’ announcements of such changes, 
however, are distorting taxpayer behavior in a peculiar way. 
For example, since word spread that consumer electronics are 
likely to disappear as Return Gift options, there has been a 
surge of housewives in their 50s who made donations to 
Ibaraki Prefecture in order to receive cordless vacuums while 




121 Donations Under Hometown Tax Payment Program Hit Record ¥284 
Billion in 2016, supra note 32. 
122 Furusato nōzei, jichitai 76% “minaoshi” kōgaku henrei no jishuku 
yōsei-uke [Municipalities Receive Request to Withhold High Value Return 
Gifts and 76% of Municipalities Review], NIKKEI SHIMBUN (May 8, 2017), 
http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASDC02H1P_Y7A500C1EA1000/ 
[perma.cc/Z6D7-9XJ8]. 
123 Furusato nōzei, kako saikōno 2844-okuen 16-nendo 72% zō [28.44 
Billion Yen, the Highest Amount, 72% Increase in 2016], NIKKEI SHIMBUN 
(July 4, 2017), https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASFS04H06 
_U7A700C1MM0000/ [perma.cc/EV7V-C688]. 
124 See supra note 119. 
125 See Henreihin wa kyōdo-ai yori tsuyoshi [Return Gifts Are Stronger 
than Love for Hometowns], NIKKEI SHIMBUN (May 20, 2017), 
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO16600370Z10C17A5000000/ 
[perma.cc/M2TJ-R8GJ]. 
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Such surges may strain local governments if they lack 
sufficient supply to fulfill the orders.  
Further, some local governments feel wronged by the 
government guidelines. A local government from Western 
Japan claimed that the government regulation of the goods 
that could be offered as Return Gifts and the imposition of a 
maximum Return-Gift-Value-to-Donation Ratio had 
“suddenly kicked away the ladder,” presumably on which that 
local government could have climbed financially to the top.126 
ii. Inefficient Use of Tax Revenue  
Given the fierce competition within the Hometown Tax 
system in Japan, some local governments have begun offering 
Return Gifts that comprise such a high percentage of the 
donation that, after incurring the costs of advertising, buying 
and delivering the Return Gifts, they are left with very little 
revenue to use for public purposes.  
For instance, the town of Kamishihoro on the island of 
Hokkaidō, which is famous for hot air balloons, offered a hot 
air balloon ride as a Return Gift for any donor that contributed 
over ¥500,000 (approx. $4545).127 Kamishihoro also offered to 
give donors hot air balloon rides outside of Hokkaidō for 
contributions over ¥1,000,000. Giving donors this experience 
cost the town almost the entire amount of the donations it 
received, allowing it to retain barely any of the donation as tax 
revenue.128 According to a town official, Kamishihoro offered 
the hot air balloon rides despite their high cost because “it’s 
important to let people know about Kamishihoro’s culture.”129 
Increasing awareness about Kamishihoro’s culture and 
enticing donors to visit and have an enjoyable experience in 
its precincts may lead donors to become future Kamishihoro 
residents themselves. As such, while it may be inefficient from 
a short-term revenue-collection standpoint, this practice is 
 
126 Id.  
127 ‘Hometown Tax’ Gifts Grow More Attractive, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 19, 
2014, at 3. 
128 See id.  
129 Id.   
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justifiable, and even endorsable, if it ends up furthering the 
long-term aim of attracting future residents or more visitors 
to the municipality in person. Whether such a strategy would 
be at odds with the 2017 guidelines on the Return-Gift-Value-
to-Donation Ratio cap of thirty percent remains to be seen.  
Of course, an inefficient ratio would not be justifiable if it 
neither (i) stimulates local businesses nor (ii) reinforces the 
culture or tradition of a municipality to attract visitors and 
new residents. A Return Gift system that results in a revenue 
shortfall but offers neither of these benefits would fail to even 
meet the prior aim of increasing the absolute monetary 
amount of local government revenue. The 2017 guidelines 
limiting the Return-Gift-Value-to-Donation Ratio decrease 
the potential for inefficient use of revenue.   
iii. Inefficient Use of Local Government 
Workers 
A Hometown Tax system is costly, as it requires local 
government officials to spend a lot of time on advertising the 
local products to compete with other municipalities for 
taxpayers’ donations. Arguably, the local government workers 
could better spend their time performing other tasks. In 
response to this concern, most local governments have been 
creating new marketing positions so that typical government 
officials do not have to take on the role of marketing Return 
Gifts to potential donors. If ultimately the Hometown Tax 
system yields positive net income for the local government, 
the use of local government workers’ time to further the 
process is actually more efficient than the alternative of 
having the same government workers spend their time 
applying for federal funding of town projects.130  
2. Democratic Concerns and Crowdfunding 
Hometown Tax donations may also raise democratic 
concerns. The Hometown Tax system functions because 
 
130 See supra Section II.B. (discussing how the Hometown Tax has 
reduced local government reliance on LAT grants). 
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donors pay tax money to municipalities and/or states in which 
they do not live. Donors thus cannot vote in local elections to 
ensure their money is used in ways they support. However, 
the Hometown Tax system effectively preempted this issue by 
allowing donors to search for local recipient governments 
based on the specific causes their donations will fund. In fact, 
the very act of selecting a cause to support allows taxpayers 
to vote with their wallet to further a cause they care about.   
Local governments are also addressing this issue by taking 
other affirmative steps to disclose the use of funds, such as 
crowdfunding specific projects. Rather than waiting for donors 
to fortuitously filter their online searches for the particular 
causes or products that the local government happens to offer 
or the geographic area131 that the municipality happens to be 
in, some local governments have started donation campaigns 
for specific projects. These “Government Crowdfunding” 
municipalities publish the total funding requested and impose 
a time limit, operating just like common crowdfunding 
websites in the United States. The Furusato Choice online 
portal has made this a viable mechanism for raising money 
and has an entire page devoted to Government Crowdfunding 
projects. 132  Donations to local government crowdfunding 
efforts qualify as Hometown Tax donations and are therefore 
eligible for income tax deductions and inhabitant tax 
 
131 Satofuru and Furusato Choice (online portals) allow browsers to 
search for gifts by the eight greater regions within Japan ((i) the northern 
island of Hokkaidō; (ii) southern islands of Kyūshū/Okinawa; (iii) 
southwestern island of Shikoku; and the five regional segments of the main 
island of Honshū: (iv) the Tōhoku northeast region; (v) the Kantō east 
region; (vi) the Chūbu middle region; (vii) the Kinki southwestern region; 
and (viii) the Chūgoku far west region. Each region is comprised of one to 
nine Prefectures (similar to U.S. state regions, e.g. New England)). Furusato 
nōzei o chīki kara sagasu [Search Furusato Nōzei by the Region], SATOFURU, 
https://www.satofull.jp/static/municipality_list.php [perma.cc/5DUR-
ATCK]; Furusato nōzei o chīki kara kensaku [Search Furusato Nōzei 
Through the Region], FURUSATO CHOICE BY TRUSTBANK, 
https://www.furusato-tax.jp/japan.html [perma.cc/ 9JL9-62LD]. 
132 Gabamento-Kuraudofandingu to wa? Genzai uketsuke-chū [What Is 
Government Crowdfunding? Current Registering Projects], FURUSATO 
CHOICE BY TRUSTBANK, https://www.furusato-tax.jp/gcf?l 
[perma.cc/5ZKV-W5EV]. 
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credits.133 Local governments participating in crowdfunding 
must reveal the exact budget breakdown for the costs that the 
requested donations will be used to cover in completing the 
project.134  
The use of Government Crowdfunding has already 
demonstrated success. After the January 2017 death of the 
sole doctor in a hospital near the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Plant (where the 2011 nuclear disaster occurred), the 
Fukushima town of Hirano launched an online crowdfunding 
campaign to collect donations via the Hometown Tax.135 With 
an aim to raise money to cover the costs of enabling a 
substitute doctor to visit the hospital every day, the town of 
Hirano set its goal to raise ¥2,500,000 (approx. $22,727) in 
nine days.136 The crowdfunding goal was reached in just one 
day.137  
Given that donors receive the opportunity to choose where 
to donate and what cause or project to support,138 the more 
 
133 Fukushima Hirano-chō Furusato nōzei de byōin shien inchō shikyo-
uke [Town of Hirano, Fukushima Supports Hospital Through Furusato 
No ̄zei, After Death of Director], NIKKEI SHIMBUN (Jan. 11, 2017), 
http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASDG10HC8_R10C17A1CR0000/ 
[perma.cc/W8CH-2RWN]. 
134 See, e.g., Kodomotachi ni chūsha de wa naku “naoru mirai” o 
todoketai [We Want Children to Have a Future of Being Cured, Not Shots], 
FURUSATO CHOICE BY TRUSTBANK, https://www.furusato-tax.jp/gcf/77 
[perma.cc/QJ5Q-MBS4] (demonstrating Saga Prefecture’s crowdfunding 
effort to further test a potential cure for Type 1 Diabetes and providing a 
specific breakdown of how the target maximum donation amount will be 
spent).  
135 Town of Hirano, Fukushima Supports Hospital Through Furusato 
Nōzei, After Death of Director, supra note 133.   
136 Id.  
137 Id.  
138 It is also noteworthy that not every municipality offers donors the 
opportunity to select the causes their donations are used towards—in fact, 
134 municipalities (7.5%) do not give donors this option. However, given 
that over 92% of municipalities do offer donors the ability to select the 
causes their donations are used for, if a donor has democratic concerns about 
the use of their tax money, they should just choose to make a donation to 
one of the 1,649 municipalities that allows them to choose the cause. Local 
Tax Bureau, Furusato nōzei ni kansuru genkyō chōsa kekka [Results from 
Survey Regarding Current Conditions of Furusato Nōzei], MINISTRY OF 
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serious issue is accountability and the ability to determine 
whether the money that the donor directed to a cause or 
project was appropriately used and whether the cause or 
project was completed.  
Yet, this issue arises in relation to every donation anyone 
makes to any charity. Once a taxpayer donates to a charity, 
newsletters or other public communications are often the only 
means of confirming that the money is actually used for the 
specific cause anticipated by the donor. One solution for 
greater ex post transparency would be to require every local 
government to maintain an online transparency portal that 
tracks the progress of donation-funded causes and projects. 
Portals of this sort already exist: The state of Indiana operates 
a regularly updated “Transparency Portal” website that 
allows taxpayers to examine local government budgets and 
actual spending, as well as revenue and detailed indebtedness 
information for counties, cities and towns, and other political 
subdivisions. 139  Assuming such online progress trackers 
would be accurately updated, they are a solution to democratic 
concerns about a potential lack of local government 
accountability to non-resident taxpayers.  
3. Vertical Equity 
A stronger critique of the Hometown Tax is that it skews 
in favor of the wealthy, which raises the vertical equity 
concern that those in society with higher income have a 
greater capacity to benefit from the policy than do others. 
Because the maximum tax-deductible amount is a fixed 
percentage of income, higher-income taxpayers have the 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMMC’NS 7 (July 4, 2017), 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000493819.pdf [perma.cc/ 8DFB-
DTJU].  
139 See Indiana Transparency Portal, IND. STATE GOV., 
http://www.in.gov/itp/2341.htm [perma.cc/3DNC-MWPL]; Indiana Gateway 
for Government Units, INFO. FOR IND., https://gateway.ifionline.org (last 
accessed Feb. 10, 2017) (including data viewable by district and provided by 
the following participating state agencies: Department of Local Government 
Finance, the State Board of Accounts, and the Indiana Education 
Employment Relations Board).  
KANZAWA – FINAL 
1138 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
ability to receive greater tax credits and higher-value Return 
Gifts. Unsurprisingly, 70.5% of all Hometown Tax donations 
in 2014 were made by donors from Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and 
their respective greater metropolitan areas. 140  However, 
these metropolises are also the most populated and highest-
educated areas in Japan, so one cannot automatically infer 
that this statistic means the wealthy are benefiting from the 
system the most. As online portals make the donation process 
convenient and accessible, and taxpayers at nearly every 
income level must pay inhabitant taxes, the Hometown Tax 
does not, on its face, benefit the wealthy more than others. 
However, the ¥2000 (approx. $18) payment required for every 
Hometown Tax donation may render the system less 
affordable for taxpayers at the margin. This would skew the 
participation rate towards higher-income taxpayers.  
Here, it is helpful to take a step back and recognize that 
even if the wealthiest are in fact the greatest beneficiaries of 
the system, the goals the Hometown Tax aims to achieve are 
not necessarily incompatible with such questionable 
distribution consequences.  
The main goals of implementing a Hometown Tax in the 
United States would be to give local governments a way to 
raise revenue and stimulate local businesses. It is true that 
the wealthy have the capacity to receive greater monetary 
value in tax credits and Return Gifts. However, because the 
ordering of Return Gifts is predicated on the taxpayers 
donating designated monetary amounts required to receive 
the Return Gifts, any wealthy donor is arguably paying their 
fair share of donations to the local government, and thereby 
raising that government’s revenue. The source of the 
 
140 Furusato Nōzei, sandai toshiken kara 7-wari 14 nen sōgaku 2.4-bai 
ni [70% of the Donations from the Three Great Metropolitan Areas; 2014’s 
Total Donation Amount Rose by 2.4 Times], NIKKEI SHIMBUN (Apr. 9, 2016), 
http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASFS08H5O_Z00C16A4MM0000/ 
[perma.cc/VDV4-T24L]; See Heisei 26-nenchū no furusato no ̄zei (kifu) ni 
yoru kifu-kin zeigaku kōjo no tekiyō jōkyō ni tsuite [Donations and Tax 
Credits in 2014 (Heisei Year 26), in “Related Documents [to Furusato 
Nōzei]”], MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMMC’NS, 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000404762.pdf [perma.cc/M3KM-
WMPP] (providing statistics on all Prefecture residents’ donation amounts).  
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donations matters very little to languishing local business 
owners seeking to increase the demand for their products or 
residents of a rural municipality hoping for the local public 
school and nearby local hospital to stay open. Such residents 
and local business owners, who are the target beneficiaries of 
the Hometown Tax, are unlikely to be worried about vertical 
equity. Thus, even if vertical equity proponents are skeptical, 
the Hometown Tax merely diverts mandatory inhabitant 
taxes, rather than involving any type of government subsidy 
greater than that already existing.  
Further, taxpayers who obtain Return Gifts through the 
Hometown Tax do not always keep the gifts for their own use. 
For example, the staff members of JBC CSR Fund, a 
scholarship-focused nonprofit organization (“NPO”) in Tokyo 
contributed ¥12 million (approx. $109,090) of their tax money 
to a town in Saga Prefecture in order to obtain Return Gifts of 
beef. 141  The NPO staff members planned to deliver what 
amounted to 380 kilograms of beef from Saga to 223 
scholarship recipients, many of whom were low-income high 
school students affected by the Kumamoto Earthquake.142 
Thus, the mere capacity of the wealthiest taxpayers to benefit 
the most from the Hometown Tax does not necessarily mean 
that they will reap significantly greater benefits than other 
taxpayers.  
Therefore, although vertical equity concerns may remain, 
this Note concludes that they do not carry enough weight to 
tip the scales against the implementation of a Hometown Tax 
system. 
4. Potential Reliance by Businesses 
Another concern with instituting a Hometown Tax system 
may be that, while a Hometown Tax may create a source of 
 
141 Shinya Haraguchi, NPO Members Donate 12 Million Yen in Taxes 
to Anti-Nuclear City, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Jan. 8, 2017, 5:40 PM), 
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201701080018.html [perma.cc/ R6LJ-
BEPF] (explaning that each of the 223 students would be able to enjoy 1.7 
kilograms of beef).  
142 Id.  
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stable demand of Return Gift supply purchases by local 
governments, local businesses might rely on that demand and 
complacently stop making efforts to find customers 
independent of those placing Return Gift orders. Such 
changes in behavior would hurt local businesses in the long 
run if the local governments later decide to change Return Gift 
suppliers or if a radical political shift causes the nation to stop 
the Hometown Tax system altogether.143  
However, there so far do not appear to be any instances of 
businesses that have irrationally stopped their efforts to find 
independent sources of revenue solely because they were 
chosen as Return Gift suppliers.144 For instance, ten percent 
of the output from livestock raisers in the town of Miyakonojō 
is now dedicated to use as Hometown Tax Return Gifts; this 
is a significant amount of their annual revenue, but has not 
caused them to stop producing the other ninety percent of 
their output. 145  One concrete solution would be for local 
governments to select Return Gift suppliers using a fair 
procedure that gives all local businesses a chance at being 
selected, such as through requests for proposals (“RFPs”). 
Using such procedures would create competition among local 
businesses, which would also help to prevent the businesses 
and producers selected to be Return Gift suppliers from 






143 It is hard to imagine a political shift drastic enough to halt the entire 
Hometown Tax system if it were to be implemented and be successful. A 
better example perhaps more suited to the United States could be a local 
beef-producing business that relies to a significant extent on its position as 
a Return Gift supplier for wealthy taxpayer donors, who some years down 
the road become vegetarians due to the increasing trend in some 
communities in the United States against consuming red meat.  
144 However, this may also be because articles about this issue have not 
been published in newspapers, or because the popularity of the Hometown 
Tax system is a recent phenomenon. 
145 Furusato Nōzei, New Customers for Specialty Goods, supra note 72.  
KANZAWA – FINAL 
No. 3:1100] THE HOMETOWN TAX AND RURAL U.S. ECONOMIES 1141 
5. Excessive Diversion of Revenue from Urban 
Governments 
Arguably the biggest challenge to the Hometown Tax is 
that the diversion of tax revenue to local governments is a 
zero-sum game. Any tax revenue donated to a recipient 
government necessarily deprives the urban residents’ own 
local governments of that tax revenue. This can harm urban 
governments if many donors in a particular municipality 
contribute the maximum amount (twenty percent of 
inhabitant taxes) to other local governments. In Setagaya 
Ward in Tokyo, which has nearly 900,000 residents, so many 
residents made Hometown Tax donations to other local 
governments that the Setagaya government lost ¥1.65 billion 
(approx. $14 million) in tax revenue in 2016. 146  Setagaya 
could have used that tax revenue to build five nursery schools, 
especially given that it faces a childcare crisis (with over 1000 
children on nursery-school waiting lists).147 The Hometown 
Tax system’s maximum inhabitant tax revenue diversion 
threshold of twenty percent technically enables Setagaya 
residents to deprive their own local government of money it 
could have used to better the Setagaya community’s well-
being.148  
By redistributing tax revenue to other prefectures and 
municipalities that need the revenue, residents may prevent 
their own local governments from receiving the revenue they 
(also) need.  
Other municipalities that face this problem have ended up 
with deficits for their Hometown Taxation budgets. Nagasaki, 
which has a population of 550,000 people, recorded a deficit of 
¥89 million (approx. $809,090) in its Hometown Tax budget 
 
146 Nohara, supra note 35.   
147 Id.  
148 Watashitachi no machi Setagaya-ku ni Furusato nōzei, SETAGAYA 
CITY GEN. AFFAIRS DEP’T. (2017), http://www.city.setagaya.lg.jp/kurashi/ 
107/158/764/771/d00018317_d/fil/furusatonouzeipanfu.pdf [perma.cc/W39G 
-Q59V].  
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in 2015.149 While the city received 1801 donations amounting 
to ¥72 million (approx. $654,545), 2692 of Nagasaki’s own 
citizens made Hometown Tax donations to other 
municipalities, which resulted in a ¥116 million (approx. 
$1.05 million) decrease in the city’s tax revenues, on top of ¥45 
million (approx. $409,090) of expenditures for Return Gifts 
and delivery costs. 150  Thus, the Hometown Tax has the 
potential to hurt, rather than help, municipalities in which 
Hometown Tax donors are concentrated: A one hundred 
percent participation rate by a municipality’s residents could 
cause twenty percent of its tax revenue to be diverted 
elsewhere in the country.  
6. Disproportionate Donations to Non-Urgent 
Causes  
Implementing a Hometown Tax may also lead to an 
allocation of donations disproportionate to the urgency of the 
causes. For instance, if the local government relies on 
donations from idiosyncratic donors from outside of its region, 
it could receive a lot of donations designated for “sports,” but 
none designated for the “local hospital.” As Hōda suggests, 
municipalities that are in dire need of funding, that benefit 
most from Hometown Tax donations, probably have projects 
in need of financing—such as the maintenance of a municipal 
sewage system or the repair of a town bridge—that donors 
would not find interesting.151 A system that gives taxpayers 
autonomy at the individual level to determine what causes to 
support may lead to a disproportionate and societally 
inefficient allocation of tax money. 152  However, the 
 
149 Masato Ishii, Gifts for Donations: Winners and Losers in “Hometown 
Tax” Program, NIPPON (July 15, 2016), 
http://www.nippon.com/en/genre/politics/l00161/ [perma.cc/R4MP-3PMC]. 
150 Id.  
151 HŌDA, supra note 97 at 76.   
152 See, e.g., Andrew Flowers, A Checkbox on Your Tax Return Helped 
Kill Public Campaign Funding, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 9, 2015), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/a-checkbox-on-your-tax-return-helped-
kill-public-campaign-funding/ [perma.cc/T2RC-D5GJ] (showing that 
although individuals are given the option on their tax returns to choose 
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implementation of a Hometown Tax should not preclude the 
local government from crowdfunding or applying for federal 
funding for projects that do not receive sufficient donations.153  
7. Counterargument: Subsidiarity and Financial 
Independence 
While a Hometown Tax system poses the risk of an 
excessive diversion of tax revenue from highly populated 
municipalities, it offers two further benefits: increased 
subsidiarity and financial independence of local governments.  
Subsidiarity is “the principle that public goods should be 
delivered and funded by the lowest feasible level of 
governance.”154  Having goods delivered and funded by the 
lowest feasible level of government allows for greater 
oversight of public goods provision155 and enables spending to 
be tailored to tastes.156  As the Hometown Tax provides a 
mechanism for local governments to raise revenue to fund 
intra-state or local projects on their own, it gives local 
governments increased autonomy and financial 
independence. Empowering local governments to fund 
projects increases subsidiarity, and greater financial 
 
whether to allocate $3 of their tax money to public funding for presidential 
campaigns, participation has declined over the last thirty years and that 
decline may have contributed to the current lack of public funding for 
elections; this indicates that allowing the source of funding for certain public 
causes to be subject to individual tax allocation decision-making can lead to 
shortfalls).  
153 Takurō Furukawa, About Furusato Nōzei and Crowdfunding, 4 
INSTITUTE FOR TOKYO MUNICIPAL RESEARCH 22 (2014), https://www.tama-
100.or.jp/cmsfiles/contents/0000000/405/hurusatonouzei.pdf [perma.cc/ 
7FAF-6QK3] (explaining that in addition to the Hometown Tax, 
crowdfunding is a further method that municipalities can use to raise 
money).  
154 Listokin & Schizer, supra note 91, at 201.  
155 Id. at 201–02 (citing Paul Seabright, Accountability and 
Decentralisation in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model, 40 EURO. 
ECON. REV. 61, 62–63, 67–68 (1996)).  
156 Id. (citing WALLACE OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 11–14, 126–28 
(1972); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416, 418-21 (1956)). 
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independence may protect states and municipalities from 
being subject to blanket federal government policies that 
make their constituents worse off.157  
IV. IMPLEMENTING A HOMETOWN TAX IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
The United States should consider instituting some 
variation of a Hometown Tax to give struggling local 
governments a method of tax revenue collection that does not 
involve raising taxes on their constituent taxpayers or relying 
on federal funding.  
U.S. startups have already begun to bring the concept of 
“crowd-funding” to local government financing. In 2012, 
Kansas City, Missouri successfully raised over $400,000 
toward establishing a downtown bicycle-sharing program158 
through using a crowdfunding website called Neighbor.ly.159 
Denver, Colorado, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Central 
Falls, Rhode Island have also used crowdfunding to fundraise 
for public projects. 160  States have even started passing 
crowdfunding laws for their local businesses (however, such 
 
157 Calvert et al., supra note 4; see also Bakeman, supra note 4 
(describing how “the federal government took advantage of states’ 
devastating fiscal circumstances,” that New York’s state financial crisis 
forced it to participate in and rely on the Race to the Top federal grant 
program out of “desperation,” and how implementing the program’s 
education reforms have led to controversy and boycotts). 
158 Charles Chieppo, Crowdfunding: A New Way to Get Things Done in 
Government, GOVERNING (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.governing.com/blogs/ 
bfc/col-crowdfunding-kansas-city-google-broadband.html [perma.cc/ 8EY9-
S2LP].  
159 Neighbor.ly has since abandoned its three-year old crowdfunding 
approach, and now offers a “community investment program” which allows 
individuals to buy bonds in city projects. Drew Lindsay, Local Governments 
and Nonprofits Test Crowdfunding for Civic Projects, CHRON. OF 
PHILANTHROPY (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Local-
Governments-and/152005 [perma.cc/M229-LP6D?type=image].  
160 Id.  
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local businesses use crowdfunding for private projects, not 
public projects).161 
There are two important differences between the U.S. 
crowdfunding efforts and a potential Hometown Tax. First, 
the existing U.S. crowdfunding efforts are  aimed at obtaining 
donations from donors living within the municipalities, 
whereas the Japanese Hometown Tax focuses on raising 
revenue for municipalities through donations from non-
resident donors.  
Second, U.S. government crowdfunding efforts may be tax-
deductible, but neither result in state or municipal tax credits 
nor offer Return Gifts, whereas the Japanese Hometown Tax 
allows participants all three benefits. The fact that the U.S. 
cities were able to raise money even without offering either of 
these benefits to donors indicates that a Hometown Tax in the 
United States has the potential for success.162  
Would a “transplant” of the Hometown Tax in the United 
States work?163 To maximize the potential for success, state 
and municipal departments of taxation would have to 
implement tax credits for Hometown Tax donations, and 
either the Return Gifts that donors receive must be treated as 
non-taxable gifts, or the current U.S. tax law on charitable 
and quid pro quo contributions would need to be modified. 
This Section will explain the legal hurdles facing the 
implementation of a Hometown Tax transplant: The U.S. law 
 
161 Stacy Cowley, Tired of Waiting for the U.S. to Act, States Pass 
Crowdfunding Laws and Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/business/smallbusiness/states-pass-
crowdfunding-laws-for-small-businesses.html [perma.cc/HD89-M5HK].  
162 This is not a fully logical inference because the donors to the 
crowdfunding efforts in these cities were the future beneficiaries of the 
public good that would be provided if the crowdfunding monetary goal was 
reached. Therefore, these donors had an interest in donating to the cause. 
In contrast, taxpayers that will never benefit personally from a local 
government’s achievement of a crowdfunding goal may not find Return Gifts 
or tax credits to be ‘worth it’ to divert taxes away from their municipality of 
residence to a faraway region. 
163 There are reasons to be skeptical about legal transplants. See, e.g., 
Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The 
Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 171 (2003).   
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on charitable contributions and the disruption to the incentive 
structure that a Return Gift-reliant Hometown Tax would 
require. It will also discuss the benefits a Return Gift-free 
Hometown Tax could provide.  
A. Quid Pro Quo Contributions Under U.S. Law  
1. Charitable Contributions Given with an 
Expectation of the Receipt of a Benefit 
In the United States, under Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) 
§ 170, individuals can claim as an itemized deduction any 
charitable contribution payment that is made within the 
taxable year.164 A “charitable contribution” is defined as a 
contribution or gift to or for the use of a list of eligible 
recipients, which includes the U.S. government, states and 
any of their political subdivisions, as well as organizations 
that are organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes.165  
There are several limits to claiming deductions for 
charitable contributions: (i) charitable contribution 
deductions are limited to fifty percent of the taxpayer’s 
adjusted gross income (“AGI”);166  (ii) a taxpayer who claims a 
charitable deduction for any form of contribution in excess of 
$250 must be able to substantiate the deduction with a bank 
record (such as a cancelled check) or a written 
acknowledgment of the donation by the charity;167 and (iii) the 
contribution or gift must be “made for exclusively public 
 
164 I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2016). § 170 also addresses charitable 
contributions by corporations, but this Note will focus solely on individual 
charitable contributions.  
165 Also included are veterans organizations, fraternal lodge 
organizations (but only if the gift is to be used for charitable purposes), and 
cemetery companies. I.R.C. § 170(c) (2016). 
166 Charitable deductions are capped at thirty percent of a donor’s 
income when made to organizations that do not fall into the prior categories. 
See I.R.C. § 170(b)(i) (2017).  
167 Written Record of Charitable Contribution, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV. (last updated Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-
profits/contributors/written-record-of-charitable-contribution [perma.cc/ 
Y636-JG39].  
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purposes.”168 Courts have interpreted the requirement that 
the contribution or gift be made exclusively for public purposes 
to mean a deduction is not allowed where a taxpayer intends 
to obtain a direct or indirect benefit from the charitable 
contribution.169 
Under Singer Co. v. United States, the receipt or expected 
receipt of a substantial benefit in return for a charitable 
contribution precludes a § 170 tax deduction.170 In that case, 
Singer sold discounted sewing machines to charities and 
schools for the predominant purpose of increasing future 
sales.171 Since Singer expected to receive a substantial benefit 
from the school discounts in the future, the court rejected 
Singer’s tax deduction for them.172 On the other hand, Singer 
was allowed to deduct the discounts it gave to charities.173 
Under Singer, a charitable contribution made with the 
expectation of a substantial benefit disqualifies a taxpayer 
from obtaining a charitable deduction, but an incidental 
benefit does not.174 
In Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit 
held that a contribution made to a charity is not made for 
exclusively public purposes if the donor receives, or 
anticipates or expects the receipt of, a substantial benefit in 
return.175 Ottawa Silica donated land to a local school board 
with the knowledge and expectation that the donation would 
result in roads being built that would increase public access 
 
168 I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) (2016). 
169 STEPHANIE B. CASTEEL, Charitable Planning Potpourri: Advanced 
Use of Basic Techniques, ALI CLE ESTATE PLAN. COURSE MATERIALS J., Apr. 
2014, at 5.  
170 Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 424 (Ct. Cl. 1971); I.R.C. 
§ 170 (2016). 
171 Singer, 449 F.2d at 423–24. The court reasoned that Singer’s 
purpose in discounting sewing machine sales to schools was to encourage 
the students to use the sewing machines so they were therefore more likely 
to purchase Singer Co. sewing machines in the future. Id.  
172 Id.  
173 Id. at 424.  
174 Id.  
175 Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 
1983).  
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to separate land the company owned.176 The court concluded 
that the expected receipt of benefits “at least partially” 
prompted Ottawa Silica to make a donation, 177  thereby 
precluding the possibility that the donation was made 
exclusively for “public purposes.” 178  Accordingly, the court 
denied a tax deduction for the value of the donated land.179  
More recently, in DuVal v. Commissioner, the Tax Court 
held that whether a transfer is a charitable contribution for 
purposes of § 170(c) hinges on what the court determines to be 
the taxpayer’s “primary or dominant intent or purpose in 
making the transfer.”180 In sum, for a charitable contribution 
to fully qualify for a tax deduction, “the donor may not expect 
a direct or indirect benefit from the donation.”181  
2. Quid Pro Quo Contributions 
Quid pro quo charitable contributions are payments a 
donor makes to a charity both (i) as a contribution and (ii) to 
receive goods or services in return. In the United States, only 
the portion of the payment’s value that is an unreciprocated 
charitable contribution—the total donation minus the value of 
good or service the donor has received as a quid pro quo for 
the contribution—is tax deductible. In 1993, Congress enacted 
§ 6115 of the IRC, which provides that payments made partly 
as a contribution and partly as consideration for goods or 
services provided to the donor by the recipient organization 
are “quid pro quo contributions.”182 Section 6115 requires that 
for any quid pro quo contribution over $75, the recipient 
organization must provide the donor with a written statement 
that informs the donor that the contribution’s deductibility is 
limited to: the amount of the contribution minus the value of 
 
176 Id. at 1135. 
177 Id.  
178 Id. at 1131. 
179 Id. at 1140. 
180 DuVal v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1375 (1994). 
181 CASTEEL, supra note 169, at 6.  
182 I.R.C. § 6115(b) (2016). 
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the goods or services provided by the recipient organization.183 
Further, the statement must provide the donor with a good 
faith estimate of the value of such goods and services.184 
Quid pro quo contributions work as follows: If a donor gives 
Carnegie Hall $100 and receives a concert ticket valued at 
$40, the charitable contribution portion of the payment is 
$60.185 Even though the portion of the contribution available 
for the deduction is $60 and therefore does not exceed $75, the 
donor must file a disclosure statement because the quid pro 
contribution, $100, exceeds $75.186  
There are two notable exceptions to the disclosure 
statement submission requirement that reduce reporting 
requirements for both charities and taxpayers: (i) the 
insubstantial benefit exception and (ii) the intangible benefit 
exception.  
Under the insubstantial benefit exception, a donor can 
deduct the entire value of a quid pro quo contribution, 
provided that (a) the total cost of all gift items received by the 
donor does not exceed $10.50; (b) the donor makes a 
contribution of $52.50 or more and the benefit received is a 
low-cost item under $10.50; or (c) the fair market value of all 
the gifts received by the donor in connection with the 
contribution do not exceed $105 or two percent, whichever is 
less.187  
Under the intangible benefit exception, a disclosure 
statement is not needed when a “quid pro quo” donor receives 
only an intangible religious benefit in return. 188  The IRS 
specifies that to be tax-deductible, the intangible religious 
benefit the donor receives must be provided to the donor by an 
 
183 I.R.C. § 6115(a) (2016) (“the excess of the amount of any money and 
the value of any property other than money contributed by the donor over 
the value of the goods or services provided by the organization”). 
184 Id.  
185 Substantiating Charitable Contributions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 
(Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/substantiating-
charitable-contributions [perma.cc/6FR6-GW4N].   
186 Id.  
187 Rev. Proc. 2014–61, 2014–47 I.R.B. 860, 867 (2014). 
188 Substantiating Charitable Contributions, supra note 185.  
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organization organized exclusively for religious practices and 
the benefit must be of a type generally not sold in a 
commercial transaction outside the donative context. 189 
Although it is not enumerated in the IRS guidelines, the 
intangible benefit exception also applies to nonreligious 
intangible benefits, referred to as “psychic benefits.” For 
instance, if an individual contributes money to a university in 
return for the university’s agreement to name a building after 
the individual, the contribution is fully deductible, despite the 
obvious psychic benefit of having one’s name on a building.190  
The U.S. system makes sense from a theoretical 
perspective as an attempt to encourage and reward only the 
portion of a quid pro quo contribution made with “purely” 
charitable intent.  
B. Divergence Between Japanese and U.S. Treatment 
of Return Gifts and Harmonizing a Hometown Tax 
with U.S. Law 
Unlike the U.S. legal treatment of quid pro quo 
contributions for which a donor would not be able to deduct 
the value of a typical Return Gift, Japan’s National Tax 
Agency allows taxpayers to receive income tax deductions on 
the full amount 191  of their donations to state and local 
governments, even though most are quid pro quo 
contributions. This reveals a legal divergence between 
Japanese and U.S. law.192 Unlike the U.S. requirement that, 
in order to be tax deductible, a charitable contribution must 
be made “exclusively” for public purposes, Hometown Tax 
Return Gifts do not lessen the deductibility of the 
donations.193 In allowing the full income-tax deduction for the 
 
189 Id.  
190 JOSEPH BANKMAN, DAVID N. SHAVIRO & KIRK J. STARK, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION 365 (16th ed. 2012). 
191 Excluding the ¥2000 (approx. $18) required payment.  
192 There are sure to be further hurdles (especially politically) to 
implementing a Hometown Tax system in the United States, but due to the 
scope of this project, this Note will cover only some of them.  
193 Niitsu, supra note 16. 
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donation, the Japanese Hometown Tax is, in effect, a fully tax-
deductible quid pro quo donation system. Further, given that 
the Japanese Hometown Tax involves an additional 
inhabitant tax credit, the Japanese system allows donors to 
divert their donation amounts (except for the required ¥2000 
payment) to the government(s) of their choice.194 
1. Set a Maximum Return-Gift-Value-to-Donation 
Ratio  
One way to implement a Hometown Tax system involving 
Return Gifts with the U.S. legal treatment of charitable 
contributions would be to set a percentage cap on the Return-
Gift-Value-to-Donation Ratio. The United States could invoke 
the DuVal test for examining whether a donation qualifies for 
a charitable deduction—that a deduction is warranted if in 
making the donation, charity is the donor’s “primary or 
dominant intent or purpose.”195  Policymakers could decide 
that, so long as the value of a given Return Gift does not 
exceed the designated Return-Gift-Value-to-Donation Ratio, 
even if a taxpayer expects a substantial benefit (the Return 
Gift) from the donation, the donation will still have been made 
for a primarily or dominantly charitable “intent or 
purpose.”196  
For instance, the maximum Return-Gift-Value-to-
Donation Ratio could be set to thirty percent.197 Any donation 
made to receive a Return Gift valued at over thirty percent of 
the donation amount would result in quid pro quo tax 
treatment, meaning that the taxpayer would be unable to 
receive an income tax deduction for the full donation 
amount.198 Any donation made to receive a Return Gift valued 
 
194 See supra Section II.B. 
195 DuVal v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1375, 1379 (1994). 
196 As discussed above, the reality is that in Japan the Return Gifts are 
the primary reason taxpayers make Hometown Tax donations. 
197 In March 2017, the Japanese government stipulated that a thirty 
percent cap threshold should be used for setting donation amounts required 
for Return Gifts. See supra Section III.B.1.a. 
198 This idea is basically giving a “cutoff” amount for the donations to 
be treated as quid pro quo contributions. 
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at less than thirty percent of the donation amount would be 
fully eligible for an income tax deduction (and state and 
municipal tax credit, if implemented).  
2. Administrability  
The next concern with implementing a Hometown Tax 
system in the United States is that requiring donors to submit 
an additional tax verification form seems cumbersome, for 
both donors and tax officials. It may seem questionable that 
individuals would even be willing or able to understand more 
paperwork than is already necessary to submit a tax return.  
Admittedly, leaving the allocation of tax revenue to local 
governments in need to a federal governmental agency would 
avoid the potential administrative difficulty both taxpayers 
and government officials would face in dealing with donation-
verification forms from local governments. Yet, the Internal 
Revenue Service already has a system in place for processing 
such verifications. § 6115 of the IRC requires a written 
statement from charitable organizations to which donations of 
over $75 have been made.199 Thus, Hometown Tax donations 
would not require any extra “steps” beyond those already in 
place for typical charitable donations. One important caveat 
for the existing U.S. donation process is that, unlike typical 
charitable contributions, Hometown Tax donations would 
need to be available for taxpayers who claim the standard 
deduction. Confining Hometown Tax donations only to those 
that use itemized deductions is likely to deter people at the 
margin from donating.  
Additional strategies may maximize participation and 
minimize administrative costs. Japan recently passed the 
“One Stop Exception,” a new regulation under which 
taxpayers that donate to up to five local governments can do 
so without submitting any extra tax paperwork.200 Further, 
 
199 I.R.C. § 6115 (2016); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., UPDATES ON 
DISCLOSURE AND SUBSTANTIATION RULES 67 (1997), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicg97.pdf [perma.cc/5382-DSAK].  
200 The “One Stop Exception” has been cited widely as a significant 
factor that led to the surge in Hometown Tax donations in 2015. Furusato 
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as the success of the Japanese Hometown Tax demonstrates, 
an online website with easy-to-follow instructions can make 
charitable contributions to local governments a commonplace 
activity for individuals and households.  
Even if the implementation of an American Hometown Tax 
were to end up adding an additional “step” to the tax filing 
process, the competing considerations of increasing local 
government revenue, revitalizing local businesses, and 
allowing states and local governments to obtain further 
financial independence from the federal government should 
outweigh any slight increase in the effort required for its 
administration.  
3. Cultural Differences  
Skepticism may arise about instituting a system that relies 
heavily on the sending of Return Gifts in the United States, 
which some argue has less of a gift-giving culture than does 
Japan. The success of the Japanese Hometown Tax may be 
attributable in part to a cultural appreciation for 
craftsmanship or locally made gifts. Moreover, even if 
donations, including the value of Return Gifts, were fully tax-
deductible, an American Hometown Tax system simply may 
not “catch on” in society. However, empirical studies show 
American people value control over the use of their taxes,201 
and that the autonomy provided by the ability to choose how 
twenty percent of one’s local and state taxes are spent may be 
enough to garner participants.202 Thus, the added autonomy 
 
nōzeigaku 1.6-bai ni 16-nendo, Kanbō Chōkan ga mitōshi [Cabinet Secretary 
Forecasts, the 2016 Furusato Nōzei Monetary Amount Will Be 1.6 Times], 
NIKKEI SHIMBUN (Nov. 18, 2016), 
http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASFS18H6B_Y6A111C1000000/ 
[perma.cc/R4ME-E5JR].  
201 A study in which American taxpayers were allowed to allocate ten 
percent of their income taxes to any portion of the federal budget shows that 
permitting taxpayers to allocate their income tax to programs of their choice 
generates significant increases in taxpayer satisfaction. Lamberton, supra 
note 92.  
202 Listokin & Schizer, supra note 91.  
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created by an American Hometown Tax could be popular 
among taxpayers even without any Return Gifts. 
4. Benefits of an American Hometown Tax Even 
Without Return Gifts 
Even if it is impractical to modify the U.S. treatment of 
quid pro quo contributions to attract taxpayers to participate 
in the Hometown Tax with Return Gifts, the United States 
would still benefit from reliable, central online portals that 
transfer donations to local governments.  
Political issues can lead to increases in donations 
independent of changes in Return Gifts. Following the Trump 
administration’s executive order on immigration in 2017, for 
example, the American Civil Liberties Union raised seven 
times the amount it raised in prior-year online donations over 
one weekend.203 Not only charitable organizations, but also 
local governments could benefit from donor behavior spurred 
by political issues. For instance, Japanese citizens opposing 
the relocation within and construction of additional U.S. 
military bases in Okinawa have significantly increased their 
donations to Nago City, Okinawa.204 Donors have attached 
messages of support for the city’s opposition to the U.S. 
military bases to their donations, such as “I support Mayor 
Susumu Inamine, who opposed relocation of an American 
military base” indicating their decisions to donate to Nago 
City were influenced by their political views, not solely by 
Nago City’s Return Gifts.205 Another indicator that many of 
the donations are politically-influenced is that some donors 
 
203 Liam Stack, Donations to the A.C.L.U. and Other Organizations 
Surge After Trump’s Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/aclu-fund-raising-trump-travel-
ban.html [perma.cc/49Y6-THSH].  
204 In 2015, Hometown Tax donations to Nago City amounted to 
¥257.78 million (approx. $2.3 million) altogether from 1188 taxpayers, 
which was twelve times the total amount in 2014. Fiscal Year 2015 Furusato 
Taxes to Nago Reach 44,000,000 Yen Opposing Henoko Relocation, RYUKYU 
SHIMPO (Mar. 10, 2016), http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/ 2016/03/20/24686/ 
[perma.cc/CL9T-BZUG].  
205 Id.  
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gave as little as ¥300 (approx. $2.72), which does not qualify 
for Return Gifts.206 Nominal donations are evidence that the 
donations were not Return Gift-driven.  
Further, in times of emergency, donors at the margin are 
more likely to give if they have a trustworthy go-to portal 
through which to donate.207 If, upon hearing about forest fires 
in a particular region, U.S. taxpayers knew exactly where to 
make online donations directly to the affected local 
government(s) (that are eligible for both income tax 
deductions and state and municipal tax credits), local 
government(s) in need  would likely receive a larger quantity 
of donations from a wider geographic area than they currently 
receive.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Japanese Hometown Tax’s success in enabling many 
local governments to increase their tax revenue and 
revitalizing rural economies makes it worthy of attention in 
the United States. Transplanting the Hometown Tax exactly 
as it is in Japan is impractical without modifying U.S. quid 
pro quo contribution law and implementing state and 
municipal tax credits. Nonetheless, given the many rural 
economies in need of revitalization, the United States would 
do well to consider adopting some variation of a Hometown 
Tax to improve the plight of such municipalities. Every 
stagnating municipality deserves the opportunity to access 
new sources of revenue and avenues of demand for the 
products made by its local businesses. An American 
Hometown Tax, with or without Return Gifts, could provide a 
method to counteract the typical population outflow from 
rural to urban areas, at least in some regions. Further, amidst 
a politically tumultuous time when many states and urban 
 
206 Nago-shi, Furusato No ̄zei 12-bai han kichi shien, ken 4400-man’en 
[Nago City, Furusato No ̄zei 12 times, Supporting Military Base Opposition, 
44 million yen to the Prefecture], RYUKYU SHIMPO (Mar. 10, 2016), 
https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/entry-236017.html [perma.cc/7CJ3-G2NA].  
207 Regarding donations in times of emergency, see supra Section II.D 
(describing donors’ generous donations after the Kumamoto Earthquake, 
regardless of municipalities offering no Return Gifts).  
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areas have views that are at odds with those of the individuals 
in charge of their federal funding, an American Hometown 
Tax may also lead to greater subsidiarity and financial 
independence, ultimately allowing greater autonomy for both 
the political subdivisions and individuals nationwide. 
